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The Anglo-French Case (1977-1978) is only the second continental shelf boundary dispute to have been settled by judicialmeans
and the first between parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf Recognising the decisions of the Court of
Arbitrationas an important landmark in the development of continental shelf law, Professor Brown presents a detailed analysis
and assessment of the court's decisions in the light of the earlier
judgment of the InternationalCourt of Justice in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases (1969) and the continuing negotiations
in UNCLOS III.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the Second World War, there have been a number of
landmarks in the development of the rules of international law relating to the continental shelf. They include the Truman Proclamation (1945),' Lord Asquith's arbitral award in the Abu Dhabi
case, 2 the draft articles and commentaries contained in the 1956
report of the International Law Commission, 3 the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (1958),4 the judgment of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases (1969),5 and the draft articles included in the successive versions of the negotiating text produced by the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I).6 It
seems more than likely that the decision of the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case (1977-1978),7 will
1. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation), reprinted in

[1951] 1 UNrrED NATIONS

LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS 38.

2. Petroleum Dev. (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 LL.R. 144
(1951).
3. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 1, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L COAM'N 253, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.

1 (1957).

4. [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.IAS. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as
Geneva Convention].
5. [19691 LC.J. 3.
6. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Docs. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10 &Add.
1, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS III OR 1, and in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATEmRALS 1099 (1977);
Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1, reprinted in 5
UNCLOS I OR 125 (1976); Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
62/WP. 8, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS III OR 137, and in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 689
(1975).
7. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Interpretationof the Decision of 30
June 1977), Decision of 14 March 1978 (United Kingdom v. France) (on file with
the writer) Ihereinafter cited as Decision of 14 March 1978]; Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf, Decision of 30 June 1977 (United Kingdom v. France) (on file
with the writer) [hereinafter cited as Decision]. As of February 2, 1979, official

also come to be regarded as an important landmark in the development of these rules.
On the global level, the case is important as having provided
the first opportunity for an international tribunal to interpret the
rules on the delimitation of the continental shelf between
neighbouring States in a dispute in which the States concerned
were both parties to the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf. Inevitably, the judgment of the I.C.J. in the North Sea
Cases was heavily relied upon in the pleadings and extensively
commented upon by the Court of Arbitration. The case has thus
provided a valuable opportunity for a re-examination of the earlier judgment, given some eight years previously on the basis of
international customary law. It will be argued later that the Court
of Arbitration's decision is in some respects better founded than
the judgment of the I.C.J. and that its publication may help to
moderate the influence of the North Sea judgment and to discourage the more extravagant interpretations that have been put upon
some of the dicta in that judgment. At a time when UNCLOS III
is still struggling to reach agreement on, inter alia, the rules for
the delimitation of the continental shelf and of the exclusive economic zone, it may be hoped that the weary draftsmen will derive
new insights from the Court of Arbitration's timely clarification of
the law.
It seems likely that the court's decision will also be of considerable significance in the more local context. The United Kingdom
has still to settle its continental shelf boundary with Ireland 8 in
the area adjacent to that which was the subject of the court's decision, as well as in the Rockall sector further north.9 As will be
seen, many of the court's dicta may well be considered to have an
important bearing upon the problems dividing the parties in these
other areas.
The remainder of this article falls into eight main parts. Part II
describes "the arbitration area" and presents the problem as it
was put to the Court of Arbitration by the parties. Part III is concerned with the question of the applicable law. Part IV contains a
brief general description of the boundary lines laid down by the
court, and parts V-VIII present a commentary on selected aspects
publication of the court's decisions is awaited. The writer is indebted to Sir Ian
Sinclair, Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for making a
copy of the decisions available to him.
8. Ireland and the United Kingdom have agreed to refer the question to

"some form of third party settlement of a judicial nature." Decision, supra note 7,
para. 26.
9. On the Rockall sector, see Brown, Rockall and the Limits of NationalJurisdiction of the United Kingdom (pts. 1-2), 2 MARINE PoL'Y 181, 275 (1978).
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of the court's decision. Finally, part IX attempts an evaluation of
the significance of the decision.
II.

THE DisPUE

Following correspondence and informal contacts in 1964 and
1965, the United Kingdom and France opened negotiations for the
delimitation of their respective continental shelves in 1970. The
negotiations, which continued until the beginning of 1974, were
unsuccessful, and the two governments subsequently agreed to
submit their dispute to an arbitral tribunal. 0
As is made clear in the Preamble of the Arbitration Agreement,
signed in Paris on July 10, 1975,11 agreement in principle had already been reached on the delimitation of the continental shelf in
the English Channel eastward of thirty minutes west of the
Greenwich Meridian. The question put to the Court of Arbitration in Article 2(1) of the agreement was as follows: "What is the
course of the boundary (or boundaries) between the portion of
the continental shelf appertaining to the United Kingdom and the
Channel Islands and to the French Republic, respectively, westward of thirty minutes west of the Greenwich Meridian as far as
the 1,000-metre isobath?"12 Under Article 9(l), the court's decision was to include "the drawing of the course of the boundary
(or boundaries) on a chart."13
It was noted, ex abundanticautela, that the choice of the 1,000metre isobath was without prejudice to the position of either government concerning the outer limit of the continental shelf.14 The
arbitration area is shown on Figure 1.15
The Court of Arbitration consisted of five members: Professors
10. Decision, supra note 7, at 4.
11. Arbitration Agreement of July 10, 1975, United Kingdom-France, [1975] Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 137 (Cmnd. 6280).
12. Id. art. 2(1).
13. Id. art. 9(1).
14. Id. art. 2(2).
15. See p. 466 infra. The line X-Y is the "rectified" version of this line specified in the court's interpretative Decision of 14 March 1978, note 7 supra. The
writer is indebted to Dr. HJ. Smith for drawing the map.
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Briggs, Castren (President), Reuter (subsequently replaced by M.
Gros), Ustor, and Waldock. The court appointed as expert Mr.
Hans Emmel, former Director of Nautical Surveys and Charting,
Deutsches Hydrographisches Institut, Hamburg.
Under Article 10 of the Arbitration Agreement, the two governments agreed to accept as final and binding upon them the decision of the court "on the question specified in Article 2 of the
present Agreement,"'16 but either party was to be entitled, within
three months of the rendering of the decision, to refer to the court
any dispute as to the meaning and scope of the decision.' 7 The
United Kingdom government took the view that there was a discrepancy between the court's findings in the body of its decision
and the precise boundary lines specified in the dispositif and
drawn by the court's expert on the Boundary-Line Chart. The
government accordingly sought from the court a definitive declaration on the meaning and scope of the original decision in relation to two parts of the boundary line. As will be seen, the court,
in its interpretative decision of March 14, 1978, acknowledged the
need for a rectification of the dispositif and Chart in relation to
the boundary line in the Channel Islands sector but rejected the
United Kingdom's contentions in relation to the boundary line in
the Atlantic sector.18
III. THE APPLiCABLE LAw
Under Article 2(1) of the Arbitration Agreement, the court was
asked to decide the question put to it "in accordance with the
rules of international law applicable in the matter as between the
Parties."1 9
Both States were parties to the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,20 but France contended that the Convention had

never entered into force between France and the United Kingdom
because of the latter's refusal to accept certain reservations made
by France when acceding to the Convention. 21 Limitations of
16. Id. art. 10.
17. Id.
18. Decision of 14 March 1978, note 7 supra. See also notes 43 & 275 infra.
19. Arbitration Agreement of July 10, 1975, United Kingdom-France, [19751 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. 137 (Cmnd. 6280).
20. Note 4 supra.
21. Decision, supra note 7, at 11, 19. For the text of French reservations and
United Kingdom response to them, see id. paras. 33-34.

space forbid more than a passing reference to the many interesting observations of the court in its analysis of the effect of the
French reservations and of the United Kingdom's refusal to accept them. It must suffice to note the court's conclusions. Rejecting the arguments of the United Kingdom, the court found
that all three of France's reservations were true reservations
(rather than interpretative declarations) and were admissible.
On examining the effect of those reservations in the circumstances of this case, however, the court came to the conclusion
that neither of the first two reservations would in fact affect the
22
application to the case of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention.
The court did, however, attach more significance to the third
French reservation. It designated, inter alia, the "Bay of Granville" as being an area in which France considered that "special
circumstances" exist within the meaning of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention.2 3 The court found that the expression "the Bay
of Granville" had to be viewed as relating to the Channel Islands
region as a whole. The United Kingdom having rejected the reservation, the court held that Article 6 was excluded and that the delimitation in the Channel Islands region must therefore be
determined by reference to the rules of international customary
law. 24
The court was thus able to conclude that, except in the Channel
Islands region, Article 6 was applicable in principle to the delimi25
tation of the continental shelf in the arbitration area.
A. The Relationship of Article 6 to InternationalCustomary
Law
As has been seen, the court rejected the French contention that
the Geneva Convention was not the applicable law. The French
argument was two-fold: The Convention did not apply (1) because
the Convention had never entered into force between France and
the United Kingdom and (2) because it had been rendered obsolete by recent developments in customary law.2 6 This latter argu-

ment gave the court the opportunity to state its opinion on the
relationship between the Geneva Convention and recent developments in the United Nations and in State practice.
The French argument is summed up in the following passages
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

paras. 71-73.
para. 74.
para. 75.
at 11-12, 19-20.
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from the French government's submissions in the oral proceedings. France argued
[tihat the recent development of customary law, which was stimulated
particularly by the work of the United Nations, the reactions on the part of
the Governments to this work, the discussions and negotiations at the
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, and the endorsement of this development in the practice of States with respect to economic zones and
27
fishing zones of 200 miles, have rendered the 1958 Conventions obsolete.

It followed, in the French government's view,
[t]hat the rules of international law applicable in this matter between the
Parties are the rules of customary law, as stated in particular by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases and
confirmed by the subsequent practice
28 of States and the work of the Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea.

The court was prepared to recognise
both the importance of the evolution of the law of the sea which is now in
progress and the possibility that a development in customary law may,
under certain conditions, evidence the assent of the States concerned to
the modification,29 or even termination of previously existing treaty rights
and obligations.

Having examined the evidence, however, the court came to the
conclusion that
neither the records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea nor the practice of States outside the Conference provide any
such conclusive indication that the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958
is today considered by its parties to be already obsolete and no longer applicable as a treaty in force. 30

The court went on to emphasise, however, that this did not mean
that it regards itself as debarred from taking any account in these proceedings of recent developments in customary law. On the contrary, the
Court has no doubt that it should take due account of the evolution of the
sea in so far as this may be relevant in the context of the preslaw of the
31
ent case.

Clearly, the extent to which the court would take account of re-

cent developments would depend upon the degree to which the
alleged rules had emerged from their formative stage of development and had come to be accepted as new norms of international
customary law. This court, like the I.C.J., could not "as a court of
law... render judgment sub specie legisferendae, or anticipate
the law before the legislator has laid it down."32 When, however,
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id.
29. Id. para. 47.
30. Id.
31. Id. para. 48.
32. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [19741 I.C.J. 3,
para. 53.

the rules of international customary law could be clearly established, the court made it clear that having found Article 6 of the
Convention applicable in principle33 did not mean that it considered the rules of customary law discussed in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases to be inapplicable:
As already pointed out, the provisions of Article 6 do not define the conditions for the application of the equidistance-special circumstances rule;
moreover, the equidistance-special circumstances rule and the rules of
customary law have the same object-the delimitation of the boundary in
accordance with equitable principles. In the view of this Court, therefore,
the rules of customary law are a relevant and even essential
means both
34
for interpreting and completing the provisions of Article 6.

IV. THE BOUNDARY LINES
To simplify the task of determining the boundary lines, the
court divided the arbitration area into sectors. It may facilitate
understanding of the commentary on various aspects of the
court's decision, contained in parts V-VIT, if it is prefaced with a
brief general description of these sectors and of the boundary
lines laid down by the court.
A.

The Area of Narrow Waters Between the Channel Islands
Archipelago and the Coasts of Normandy and Brittany
Because of the precise formulation of Article 2(1) of the Arbi-

tration Agreement, 35 the geographical circumstances, and the replies of the parties to questions put to them by the court, the
court held that it was without competence to delimit the boundary in the disputed area.3 6 It added the observation that:
In narrow waters such as these, strewn with islets and rocks, coastal
States have a certain liberty in their choice of base-points; and the selection of base-points for arriving at a median line in such waters which is at
once practical and equitable appears to be a matter peculiarly
suitable for
37
determination by direct negotiations between the Parties.

B.

The Area Ultimately Delimited by the Line A-D38

The court had no difficulty in determining that this most easterly segment of the boundary line should be based on a median
line. Such a line was indicated by the applicable law in a case
such as this where opposite States abutted upon an area
33.
34.
35.
[19751
36.
37.
38.

Decision, supra note 7, para. 75.
Id.
Arbitration Agreement of July 10, 1975, United Kingdom-France, art. 2(1),
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 137 (Cmnd. 6280).
Decision, supra note 7, paras. 19-22.
Id. para. 22.
See Figure 1 at p. 466 supra.
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characterised by the essential continuity of the continental shelf
and by the absence of special circumstances. 3 9
C.

The Areas Ultimately Delimited by the Lines E-F and G-J

The areas between and south of points D and E called for separate consideration in view of the presence of the Channel Islands,
as did the area between points F and G because of a difference of
view over the legal status of Eddystone Rock and its effect on the
boundary line. Leaving these two segments for later consideration, the court again had no difficulty in finding that the lines E-F
and G-J should be drawn on the basis of the median line as
agreed by the parties. 0 The court noted that point J, the point
equidistant from Basse Vincent (north coast of Finistere) and the
Stags (off the Lizard in Cornwall), marked the westerly terminal
of the "simplified" median line that had been agreed between the
parties. It followed that "the agreement between the Parties regarding the median line in the western segment of the Channel
did not extend to the use of Ushant or the Scilly Isles as base4
points for delimiting a median line boundary." 1
D.

The Channel Islands Sector

The court decided that the presence of the Channel Islands
close to the French coast was "a circumstance creative of inequity" and a "special circumstance" within the meaning of Article 6
of the Geneva Convention. 4 2 It went on to find that the situation
demanded a two-fold solution. First, a line should be drawn
through points D1, D2, D3, and D4-that is, a median line constructed without reference to the Channel Islands. Second, a separate boundary line, marked X-Y on the Boundary Chart, had to
be drawn at a distance of twelve miles from the territorial sea
baselines of the Channel Islands. Such a line would not allow the
French continental shelf to encroach upon the established twelvemile fishery zone of the Channel Islands. 43
39. Decision, supra note 7, paras. 108-10.
40. Id. para. 120.
41. Id. para. 118.
42. Id. para. 196. As was seen above, the court had earlier held that the rules
of international customary law applied in this area, but the court tested its conclusion, arrived at on the basis of international customary law, by applying also the
equidistance-special circumstances rule of Article 6 of the Convention.
43. Id. paras. 201-02. As noted above, see text accompanying note 18 supra,

E.

The Area Ultimately Delimited by the Line F-G

In this area, the court found that Eddystone Rock should be
treated as a relevant basepoint for the construction of a median
line.44
F.

The Atlantic Region

The court, being of the opinion that the opposite-States situation of the parties continued for a short distance west of point J,
prescribed that the median line should be extended westward
through point K to point L.45 West of point L, however, it was
necessary to have regard for the fact that the parties abutted
upon the continental shelf in a side-by-side situation rather than
in an opposite-States situation. As the court explained, following
the thinking of the I.C.J., in such a lateral situation the distorting
effect on an equidistance line of any special geographical feature
is the more marked the further the line extends seawards. 4 6 In
this context the court found that the prolongation of the Scilly
Isles some distance further westwards than the island of Ushant,
superadded to the greater projection of the Cornish mainland
westwards beyond Finistbre, constituted a "special circumstance"
justifying a departure from an equidistance line.47 The court remedied the potential inequity by applying the "half-effect" method.
Thus, in delimiting the equidistance line L-N, only half, instead of
full, effect is given to the Scilly Isles. The line is constructed by
first drawing two equidistance lines, one using the offshore island
as a basepoint and the other ignoring the island. A boundary giving half effect to the island is then the line drawn mid-way between those two equidistance lines.4 8
G. The Complete Boundary Lines
The complete boundary lines thus consist of (1) an equidistance line from point A to point N, modified by the half-effect
method in the segment west of point M, and (2) a twelve-mile line
to the north and west of the Channel Islands. The line A-N resuited from application of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention and
the court, in its Decision of 14 March 1978, supra note 7, para. 37, acknowledged

the need for a rectification of the coordinates specified for the line X-Y in the
original Decision, note 7 =upra, of June 30, 1977. It is the rectified line that is
shown in Figure 1 at p. 466 supra.
44. Decision, supra note 7, para. 144.
45. Id. para. 252.
46. Id. para. 96 (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] LC.J. 3, para.
89(a)). See also id. para. 239.
47. Id. para. 244.
48. Id. para. 251.
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the twelve-mile line from application of the rules of international
customary law.
It is hoped that this bird's-eye view of the court's findings will
have supplied a background against which the following commentary on various selected aspects of the court's decision may be
readily understood.
V. THE NATURAL

PROLONGATION RULE: A FUNDAMENTAL

RULE?

The origin of the notion that the concept of "natural prolongation" is relevant for the delimitation of the lateral boundaries of
the continental shelf is to be found in the judgment of the I.C.J. in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.49 That judgment was of
course given on the basis of international customary law, but the
dicta in question have been widely considered relevant to the interpretation of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention and have
clearly influenced the draftsmen of the UNCLOS M negotiating
texts.5 0 The decision of the Court of Arbitration provides a timely
opportunity for a review of this proposition. Following a critical
rLsum6 of the I.C.J.'s judgment, an analysis will be presented of
the relevant passages in the decision of the Court of Arbitration.
Finally, attention will be drawn to pertinent draft articles in the
Informal Composite Negotiating Text.5 1
A.

The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases

In its analysis of the rules of international customary law in this
case, the I.C.J. attributed a special status to the Truman Proclamation. The Proclamation, having come to be regarded as the
starting point of the positive law on the continental shelf,52 "must
be considered as having propounded the rules of law in this
3
field."5
It had been argued in the Truman Proclamation that "the conti49. [1969] LCJ. 3.
50. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Docs. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10 &Add.
1, reprintedin 8 UNCLOS III OR 1, and in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1099 (1977);
Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1, reprinted in 5
UNCLOS I OR 125 (1976); Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
62/WP. 8, reprintedin 4 UNCLOS I OR 137, and in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 689
(1975).
51. U.N. Docs. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10 & Add. 1, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS In OR 1,
and in INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1099 (1977).
52. [1969] LC.J. para. 47.
53. Id. para. 86.

nental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of

the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it."54 The
court described as the "chief doctrine" enunciated by the proclamation the proposition that the coastal State has "an original, natural, and exclusive (in short a vested) right to the continental
55
shelf off its shores."
In other passages the court referred to this same notion at
greater length:
What confers the ipso jure title which international law attributes to the
coastal State in respect of its continental shelf, is the fact that the submarine areas concerned may be deemed to be actually part of the territory
over which the coastal State already has dominion,-in the sense that, although covered with water, they are a prolongation or continuation of that
territory, an extension of it under the sea. From this it would follow that
whenever a given submarine area does not constitute a natural-or the
most natural-extension of the land territory of a coastal State, even
though that area may be closer to it than it is to the territory of any other
State, it cannot be regarded as appertaining to that State,-or at least it
cannot be so regarded in the face of a competing claim by a State of
whose land territory the submarine area concerned
is to be regarded as a
56
natural extension, even it it is less close to it.

Again, the court described as "the most fundamental of all the
rules relating to the continental shelf" the rule that:
[Tihe rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf
that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under
the sea exist ipsofacto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the
land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for5 7the
purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources.

The court drew from this fundamental rule the conclusion that,
in accordance with "the basic concept of continental shelf entitlement,"58 the process of delimitation was essentially one of drawing a boundary line between areas that already appertained to
one or other of the States affected. The delimitation had to "be
equitably effected, but it [could not] have as its object the awarding of an equitable share, or indeed of a share, as such, at all-for
the fundamental concept involved [did] not admit of there being
anything undivided to share out."59 It may be noted in passing
that it is quite possible to accept the proposition that the object of
delimitation is not the award of equitable shares without accepting the relevance of the concept of natural prolongation to the
question of lateral delimitation.
54. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation), reprinted in
[1951] 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAws AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIE OF THE HIGH SEAS 38.
55. [1969] LC.J. para. 47.
56. Id. para. 43.
57. Id. para. 19.
58. Id. para. 20.
59. Id.
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Another basic concept that the court drew from the Truman
Proclamation was that delimitation must be effected in accordance with equitable principles. 60 Subsequently, the court stated
that equitable principles must be applied "in accordance with the
ideas which have always underlain the development of the legal
regime of the continental shelf in this field," including the idea
that "the continental shelf of any State must be the natural prolongation of its land territory and must not encroach upon what is
6
the natural prolongation of the territory of another State." 1
In another passage, 62 the court explained that there is no legal
limit to the considerations that States may take into account to
ensure the application of equitable principles. Various features
had to be put into the balance. Two of these features, as described by the court, have a bearing on the concept of natural prolongation. Thus, of the geological factor, the court said:
[I]t can be useful to consider the geology of [the] shelf in order to find out
whether the direction taken by certain configurational features should influence delimitation because, in certain localities, they point-up the whole
notion of the appurtenance of63the continental shelf to the State whose territory it does in fact prolong.

Of the geographicalfactor, it said:
[i1t is... necessary to examine closely the geographical configuration of
the coastlines of the countries whose continental shelves are to be delimited. This is one of the reasons why the Court does not consider that
markedly pronounced configurations can be ignored- for, since the land is
the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial
extensions to seaward, it must first be
64 clearly established what features
do in fact constitute such extensions.

Finally, attention may be drawn to the court's reference to overlapping natural prolongations. The court foresaw that application
of equitable principles in accordance with the factors it had identified might lead to an overlapping of the areas appertaining to
the States concerned. It accordingly provided that such a situation must be dealt with by an agreed division or, failing that, an
equal division of the overlapping areas; alternatively, there might
be agreement for joint exploitation, this being particularly appropriate when it was a question of preserving the unity of a deposit.65
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See E. BROWN, THE LEGAL REGIME
[19691 I.C.J. para. 85.
Id. para. 93.
Id. para. 95.
Id. para. 96.
Id. para. 99.

OF HYDROSPACE

43-47 (1971).

In a work published in 1971, the writer suggested that the
court's judgment was open to criticism, inter alia, because of its
attitude to the Truman Proclamation. 66 It was argued that the
court had elevated vague passages in the proclamation to the status of fundamental principles and then proceeded to deduce detailed rules from them by a method that could not be considered
to be a legitimate use of the deductive process. It was suggested
that the court's use of the description of the continental shelf in
the Truman Proclamation as being "an extension of the land mass
and thus naturally appurtenant to it"67 stretched the language of
the proclamation beyond all reason. It was concluded that:
There is really nothing in the Proclamation or in subsequent United
States practice[ 68 to suggest that the concept of natural appurtenance
had any bearing on the question of lateral delimitation. The concept of
natural prolongation belongs to the problem of the seaward extension of
the continental shelf, not to its delimitation as between opposite or adjacent States. This is clearly indicated by the admission that areas of natural appurtenance may overlap-an admission which obliged the Court to
resort, somewhat "unnaturally," to distinguishing between "natural" and
"most natural" prolongations of territory.169 It may be reasonable to
speak of the continental shelf (perhaps more accurately, the continental
terrace or margin) [70 ]as being the natural prolongation of the land territory as a whole (on the basis of a distinction between the geological character of the continental "land" mass and that of the bed and subsoil of the
true ocean); it is quite another matter to say that a particular area of shelf
is the natural prolongation of the territory of State A, that is, of a politically determined area. It is surely the case that any part of the continental shelf is a natural prolongation of the territory of any State which lies
on the same continental land-mass. There is nothing natural about carving up the shelf to allow for
unity of selected geological features and even
71
less for unity of deposits.

In short, it was the writer's opinion in 1971 that the concept of
natural prolongation was irrelevant to the delimitation of lateral
boundaries of the continental shelf under international customary
law.
Because the court described the natural prolongation rule as
"the most fundamental of all the rules relating to the continental
shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention,
though quite independent of it,"72 there is every reason to think

that the court would have regarded the concept of natural prolongation as relevant also to the delimitation of a lateral boundary
66. E. BRowN, supra note 60, at 47-51.
67. Id. at 49.
68. See id. at 48 nn.40 & 41.
69. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
70. The continental terrace includes the geological continental shelf and continental slope. The continental margin includes the terrace and the continental rise,
E. BOwN, supra note 60, at 74.
71. Id. at 49.
72. [1969] LCJ. para. 19.
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under Article 6(2) of the Convention. However, because Article
6(2) contains specific rules for the delimitation of lateral boundaries and nowhere mentions any such concept as natural prolonga73
tion, this view hardly seems tenable.
The view was expressed above that the concept of natural prolongation belongs to the problem of the seaward extension of the
continental shelf, not to its delimitation as between opposite or
adjacent States. It is perhaps necessary to qualify this view by
saying that it holds good only so long as it may be assumed that
the neighbouring States abut upon one continuous continental
shelf. Thus, if there is "a major and persistent structural discontinuity of the seabed and subsoil of such a kind as to interrupt the
essential geological continuity of the continental shelf,"74 then in
a sense the concept of natural prolongation would be relevant to
the question of delimitation. It would, however, be more accurate
in such cases to describe the situation in terms of two separate
continental shelves. This is the case, for example, with the Timor
Trench boundary between Australia and Indonesia, the 2,000-metre-deep trench marking the northern limit of the Australian continental margin.
The Timor Trench situation is of course one between opposite
States. While theoretically possible, it would be extremely unusual to find such a major geological discontinuity extending laterally across the shelf in the vicinity of the land boundary of
adjacent States. It is quite normal to find relatively superficial or
secondary depressions or channels running across a continuous
continental margin-often originating in an ancient fluvio-glacial
drainage system-but such features are not major geological discontinuities.
The Court of Arbitration had occasion to deal with such a secondary feature in the Anglo-French Case when considering the
United Kingdom's alternative submission that the continental
shelf boundary should follow the Hurd Deep-Hurd Deep Fault
Zone, should the court decide that those geological faults were
such as to "interrupt the essential geological continuity of the
continental shelf."7I
The Hurd Deep is situated near the centre of the English Chan73. Geneva Convention, note 4 supra.
74. Decision, supra note 7, para. 104.
75. Id. para. 106.

nel just off the Channel Islands.7 6 It is some 150 kilometres long,
two to six kilometres wide, and has an average depth of about 115
metres-only forty-five metres below the average level of the floor
of the Channel. It appears to be part of a series of faults ex-

tending for a distance of some eighty nautical miles, with a width
of between one and three nautical miles and a depth of over 100

metres. 77

The parties were at one in considering that the faults did not
detract from the geological continuity of the continental shelf,
though the United Kingdom, in its alternative submission, did
consider that the Hurd Deep Fault Zone constituted a major and
8
persistent rift in the structure of the shelf.7
The Court of Arbitration did not agree:
Whichever way the matter is put, the Court does not consider that the
Hurd Deep-Hurd Deep Fault Zone is a geographical feature capable of exercising a material influence on the determination of the boundary either
in the Atlantic region or in the English Channel. The Court shares the
view repeatedly expressed by both Parties that the continental shelf
throughout the arbitration area is characterised by its essential geological
continuity. The geological faults which constitute the Hurd Deep and the
so-called Hurd Deep Fault Zone, even if they be considered as distinct
features in the geomorphology of the shelf, are still discontinuities in the
seabed and subsoil which do not disrupt the essential unity of the continental shelf either in the Channel or the Atlantic region. Indeed, in comparison with the deep Norwegian Trough in the North Sea, they can only
be regarded as minor faults in the geological structure of the shelf; and
yet the United Kingdom agreed that the trough should not constitute an
obstacle to the extension of Norway's continental shelf boundary beyond
that major fault zone. Moreover, to attach critical significance to a physical feature like the Hurd Deep-Hurd Deep Fault Zone in delimiting the
continental shelf boundary in the present case would run counter to the
whole 79tendency of State practice on the continental shelf in recent
years.

The court went on in a later passageO to say that even if it were
to find that the equidistance line was not the appropriate boundary, it would be because some geographical feature amounted to a
"special circumstance" justifying another boundary under Article
6 or because, by rendering the equidistance line inequitable it
called for the use of some other method under international customary law. The court proceeded then to say that:
[T]he axis of the Hurd Deep-Hurd Deep Fault Zone is placed where it is
simply as a fact of nature, and there is no intrinsic reason why a boundary
along that axis should be the boundary which is justified by the special
which, under customary law, is needed
circumstances under Article 6 or 81
to remedy the particular inequity.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See Figure 1 at p. 466 supra.
Decision, supra note 7, para. 9.
Id. para. 12.
Id. para. 107.
Id. para. 108.
Id.

[voL 16: 461, 19791

Continental Shelf Case
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

It is of course true that the Hurd Deep is a very minor depression in the shelf. Nevertheless, the references that the court
made to (1) the Norwegian Trough, (2) the absence of any disruption of the essential unity of the continental shelf, and (3) "the
whole tendency of State practice ... in recent years" 82 strongly

suggest that its reasoning would also apply to other channels or
depressions that could not be regarded as major geological discontinuities.
B. The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case
This case was primarily concerned with a situation of opposite
States (indeed, exclusively so in the Channel Islands sector, in relation to which most of the court's many references to natural
prolongation were made). As noted above, however, the same
considerations apply to both opposite- and adjacent-coast situations so long as the States in question abut upon one continuous
continental shelf. The decision is therefore relevant also to the
case of a lateral delimitation between adjacent States.
In paragraph 77 of its decision, the Court of Arbitration quoted,
apparently with approval, the passage in the judgment in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases in which the I.C.J. described
the principle that a coastal State has inherent rights in the continental shelf that constitutes the natural prolongation of its land
territory as "the most fundamental of all the rules relating to the
continental shelf."83 It went on to refer to two conclusions that
the I.C.J. had drawn from this fundamental rule and that the
Court of Arbitration described as "being of general application."84
The second of these conclusions was "that the continental shelf
of any State must be the natural prolongation of its land territory
and must not encroach upon what is the natural prolongation of
the territory of another State."8 5 The Court of Arbitration went
on to say that: "This conclusion follows directly from the fundamental rule itself and is, indeed, merely an application of that
rule to the context of a single area of continental shelf upon
8
which the territories of two or more States abut." 6
82. Id. para. 107.
83. Id. para. 77 (quoting [19691 I.C.J. para. 19).
84. Id.

85. Id. para. 79.
86. Id.

So far, then, the Court of Arbitration seems to be at one with
the I.C.J. In the immediately following sentence, however, there
is a strong hint that the Court of Arbitration takes a very different
view from that of the I.C.J. on the relevance of the concept of natural prolongation to lateral delimitation; and this hint, as will be
seen, becomes a certainty in later passages of the decision. The
Court of Arbitration went on from the above passage to say that:
So far as delimitation is concerned, however, this conclusion states the
problem rather than solves it. The problem of delimitation arises precisely because in situations where the territories of two or more States
abut on a single continuous area of continental shelf, it may be said geographically to constitute a natural prolongation of the territory of each of
the States concerned. Consequently, it is rather in the rules of customary
law discussed in the North Sea ContinentalShelf cases and which are specifically directed to delimitation that guidance may be sought regarding
the principles to be applied87in determining the boundary of the continental shelf in such situations.

This would seem to be tantamount to saying that the concept of

natural prolongation is really irrelevant to the problem of lateral
delimitation.

At first sight, this conclusion hardly seems to square with paragraph 191 of the decision of the Court of Arbitration:
The continental shelf of the Channel Islands and of the mainlands of
France and of the United Kingdom, in law, appertains to each of them as
being the natural prolongation of its land territory under the sea. The
physical continuity of the continental shelf of the English Channel means
that geographically it may be said to be a natural prolongation of each one
of the territories which abut upon it. The question for the Court to decide,
however, is what areas of continental shelf are to be considered as legally
[emphasis original] the natural prolongation of the Channel Islands
rather than of the mainland of France. In international law, as the United
Kingdom emphasized in the pleadings, the concept of the continental
shelf is a juridical concept which connotes the natural prolongation under
the sea not of a continent or geographical land mass but of the land territory of each State. And the very fact that in internationallaw the continental shelf is a juridicalconcept means that its scope and the conditions
for its applicationare not determined exclusively by the physicalfacts of
geography but also by legal rules. Moreover, it is clear both from the insertion of the "specialcircumstances"provision in Article 6 andfrom the emphasis on "equitable principles"in customary law that the force of the
cardinalprinciple of "naturalprolongation of territory" is88 not absolute,
but may be subject to qualification in particularsituations.

Prima facie, this passage might seem to endorse the I.C.J.'s conception of the legal continental shelf as being the natural prolongation not of a natural feature but of a political feature-that is,
the land territory of a State, the area of which is, clearly, a product of history and politics. It would perhaps be more accurate,
however, to say that the Court of Arbitration pays lip service to
this conception in the earlier part of this quotation but then pro87. Id.
88. Id. para. 191 (emphasis added).
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ceeds, in the later italicised part, to hint once more that the concept of natural prolongation may not be relevant to the problem
of lateral delimitation. Admittedly, in this passage it is still no
more than a hint, and the Court of Arbitration still seems determined not to diverge too far from the line taken by the I.C.J. The
same can perhaps be said of paragraph 194:
The true position, in the opinion of the Court, is that the principle of natural prolongation of territory is neither to be set aside nor treated as absolute in a case where islands belonging to one State are situated on
continental shelf which would otherwise constitute a natural prolongation
of the territory of another State. The application of that principle in such
a case, as in other cases concerning the delimitation of the continental
shelf, has to be appreciated in the light of all the relevant geographical
and other circumstances. When the question is whether areas of continental shelf, which geologically may be considered a natural prolongation
of the territories of two States, appertain to one State rather than to the
other, the legal rules constituting the juridical concept of the continental
shelf take over and determine the question. Consequently, in these cases
the effect to be given to the principle of natural prolongation of the coastal
State's land territory is always dependent not only on the particular geographical and other circumstances but also on any relevant considerations
of law and equity.8 9

If, however, one penetrates the theoretical smokescreen and determines the actual ratio decidendi in relation to the delimitation
in the Channel Islands region, the real position of the Court of Arbitration becomes apparent. The real grounds of the court's decision can be perceived by a close examination of the following
passages, the first of which follows immediately after paragraph
191, reproduced above, and reads as follows: "Accordingly, in the
opinion of the Court, the principle of natural prolongation of territory cannot be said to require that the continental shelf to the
north and north-west of the Channel Islands should be considered as automatically and necessarily appurtenant to them rather
than to the French Republic." 90
Having thus eased the concept of natural prolongation out of its
way, the court proceeds, in paragraph 195, to reformulate the
question it has to answer:
[T]he question is whether the Channel Islands should be given the full

benefit of the application of the principle of natural prolongation in the areas to their north and north-west or whether their situation close to the
mainland of France requires, on equitable grounds,
some modification of
the application of the principle in those areas. 91
89. Id. para. 194.
90. Id. para. 192.
91. Id. para. 195.

The Court of Arbitration had no difficulty in finding the "ground
of equity" "in the particular circumstances of the present case
and in the particular equality of the two States in their geographical relation to the continental shelf of the Channel."92 It decided
that the presence of the Channel Islands close to the French coast
must be considered, prima facie, as a circumstance creative of inequity and a "special circumstance" within the meaning of Article
6 of the Geneva Convention. This prima facie finding was then
tested against the "relevant circumstances" or "equitable considerations" invoked by the United Kingdom, namely: (1) the political and economic importance of the Channel Islands, (2) their
close ties with the United Kingdom and the latter's security and
defence responsibility for them, and (3) the fact that the Islands
have no possibility of an appreciable area of continental shelf except to their west and north. The court, weighing these equitable
considerations in the balance, decided that the continental shelf
of the Channel Islands should be restricted to a twelve-mile enclave which, on the assumption that the United Kingdom later extends its territorial sea to twelve miles, will in effect mean that
the Channel Islands will have no continental shelf at a11!93
It is revealing at this point to pose the question: What difference would it have made to the court's decision if it had made no
mention of the concept of natural prolongation? The answer is
clear: It would have made no difference whatsoever. This answer
is not surprising, for the ratio of the decision is in reality nothing
more nor less than the substance of the special-circumstances
rule of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention. 94 This being so, this
arbitral award can hardly be considered to have confirmed the
view that the concept of natural prolongation is relevant for the
delimitation of the continental shelf between opposite or adjacent
States.
C. The Relevance of the Proceedingsof UNCLOS III
In its pleadings in the Anglo-French Case, France argued
[t]hat the recent development of customary law, which was stimulated
particularly by the work of the United Nations, the reactions on the part of
Governments to this work, the discussions and negotiations at the Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea, and the endorsement of this developfishing
ment in the practice of States with respect to economic zones and
zones of 200 miles, have rendered the 1958 Conventions obsolete. 95

The Court of Arbitration was definite in holding that the Geneva
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. paras. 196-98.
Note 4 supra.
Decision, supra note 7, at 20.
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Convention cannot be said to be obsolete, but it went on to emphasise that this finding did not mean that the court regarded itself as

"debarred from taking any account

...

of recent

developments in customary law. On the contrary, the Court
[had] no doubt that it should take due account of the evolution of
the law of the sea in so far as ... may be relevant" 9 6 to the case.
If, following the court, one endeavours to take due account of
the evolution of the law of the sea, the obvious points of reference
are to be found in Articles 76 and 83 of the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text97-the latest fruits of the UNCLOS labours.
Article 76 of the text defines the continental shelf as follows:
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout
the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.98

Though the concept of natural prolongation is incorporated in this
definition, it is irrelevant in the present context because this Article essentially refers to the outer limit of the continental shelf
rather than to its delimitation between neighbouring States. Similarly, the text of Article 83(1) offers no assistance. It simply provides that: "The delimitation of the continental shelf between
adjacent or opposite States shall be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, employing, where appropriate,
the median or equidistance line, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances." 99 There is thus no mention of natural prolongation.
D. Conclusion
It seems fair to conclude that the decision of the Court of Arbitration serves only to confirm that the concept of natural prolongation may not properly be regarded as relevant to the
delimitation of boundaries of the continental shelf between adjacent or opposite States except possibly in a situation where a major geological discontinuity runs laterally seaward from the
96.
97.
and in
98.

Id. para. 48.
U.N. Docs. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10 & Add. 1, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS III OR 1,
16 I'Nr'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1099 (1977).
Id. art. 76.

99. Id. art. 83(1).

vicinity of the coastal terminus of the land boundary of adjacent
States or lies between the coasts of opposite States.
VI.

"SPECIAL CIRClMSTANCES" AND

"EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES"

It will be recalled that the I.C.J. found that the application of
the equidistance rule, as incorporated in Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention, was not obligatory as between the parties in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.1oo It was, therefore, unnecessary for the court to consider whether special circumstances existed in that case or to concern itself with the scope of the concept
of special circumstances. In its exposition of the corresponding
rules of international customary law, however, it was apparent
that the role of equity, as conceived by the court, was similar to
that of the concept of special circumstances. Since the court delivered its judgment in 1969, it has frequently been assumed that
the equitable factors that would justify a boundary other than an
equidistant boundary under international customary law are the
same as the factors that would constitute special circumstances
under Article 6 of the Geneva Convention. As will be seen, the
Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case
seems to sympathise with this view. The purposes of part VI of
this article are to reconsider in the light of the decision of the
Court of Arbitration (1) the meaning of special circumstances in
the sense of Article 6 and of the corresponding rules of international customary law as laid down by the I.C.J. in the North Sea
Cases and (2) the relationship between the two.
To place the views of the Court of Arbitration in proper perspective, it is necessary first to review the judgment of the I.C.J.
in the North Sea Cases and to examine the meaning of "special
circumstances" in the Geneva Convention.
A.

The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
The court held that
delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable
principles, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in such a
way as to leave as much as possible to each Party all those parts of the
continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory
into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation
101
of the land territory of the other.

The court dealt with the nature of these "equitable principles"
and "relevant circumstances" at some length. First, it said:
[T]here is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable proce100. [1969] LCJ. para. 101.
101. Id.
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dures, and more often than not it is the balancing-up of all such
considerations that will produce this result rather than reliance on one to
the exclusion of all others. The problem of the relative weight to be accorded to different
considerations naturally varies with the circumstances
102
of the case.

The court went on to add that:
In balancing the factors in question it would appear that various aspects
must be taken into account. Some are related to the geological, others to
the geographical aspect of the situation, others again to the idea of the
unity of any deposits. These criteria, though not entirely precise, can pro10 3
vide adequate bases for decision adapted to the factual situation.

Subsequently, the court specified in more detail these various
"factors" that were to be taken into account in the course of the
negotiations, referring first to "the general configuration of the
coasts of the Parties, as well as the presence of any special or unusual features."l 0 4 Of this geographicalfactor, the court had ear-

lier said:
[Ilt is... necessary to examine closely the geographical configuration of
the coastlines of the countries whose continental shelves are to be delimited. This is one of the reasons why the Court does not consider that
markedly pronounced configurations can be ignored; for, since the land is
the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial
extensions to seaward, it must first be clearly established what features
do in fact constitute such extensions.10 5

The second factor specified by the court was "so far as known
or readily ascertainable, the physical and geological structure,
0
and natural resources, of the continental shelf areas involved."1 6
Of this geological factor, the court had earlier observed that:
[I]t can be useful to consider the geology of that shelf in order to find out
whether the direction taken by certain configurational features should influence delimitation because, in certain localities, they point-up the whole
notion of the appurtenance of10the
continental shelf to the State whose ter7
ritory it does in fact prolong.

In relation to natural resources, the court did not regard preserva-

tion of unity of deposits as a major factor but merely "a factual
element which it is reasonable to take into consideration in the
course of the negotiations."' 08
Third, the court indicated that the factors to be taken into account should include
the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimita102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

para.
para.
para.
para.
para.
para.
para.

93.
94.
101.
96.
101.
95.
97.

tion carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring
about between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to
the coastal State and the length of its coast measured in the general direction of the coastline, account being taken for this purpose of the effects,
actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf delimitations between
adjacent States in the same region. 1 0 9

In another passage the court referred to this proportionalityfac-

tor as follows:
[T]he element of a reasonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation effected according to equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to the States
concerned and the lengths of their respective coastlines,--these being
measured according to their general direction in order to establish the
necessary balance between States with straight, and those with markedly
concave or convex coasts, or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their
truer proportions. 1 10

It is submitted that the analysis of "special circumstances"
given below shows that this concept is much more limited in
scope and less open to arbitrary concretisation than the principle
of equity as interpreted by the court.
B. The Meaning of "Special Circumstances" in Article 6 of the
Geneva Convention

The object of this section is to clarify the intended scope of

"special circumstances." On analysis of the evidence, it is possi-

ble to identify factors clearly falling within this category, to eliminate other factors, and to establish guidelines for the evaluation
of claims made for yet others.
At the outset, it should be made clear that there can be no

question of regarding the concept as being so vague and all-embracing as to justify settlement of disputes ex aequo et bono. Although Professor Spiropoulos stated, when he introduced the
term into the International Law Commission (ILC) debate,"' that
his formula would enable arbitrators to settle disputes ex aequo
et bono,112 subsequent developments indicate quite clearly that
3
this view was rejected."
109. Id. para. 101.
110. Id. para. 98.
111. Summary Records of the 204th Meeting, [19531 1 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 124,
130, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
112. Summary Records of the 205th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. Ir'TL L COMM'N 130,
132, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1953 (1959).
113. See Professor Lauterpacht's remarks, id. at 131; the response of States referred to in Comments by Governments on the draft articles on the continental
shelf and related subjects prepared by the International Law Commission at its
third session in 1951, Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 42, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in
[1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 200, 241, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1953/Add. 1 (1959);
rejection by the UNCLOS I Fourth Committee of the Netherlands proposal to empower the LC.J. to decide ex aequo et bono on existence of special circumstances,
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Given that the matter is not to be determined ex aequo et bono,
it is clearly desirable that the rule should be as specific as possible-hence the plea by Professor Lauterpacht for a full explanation in the commentary, together with an enumeration of specific
instances;114 hence, too, the statement of the Yugoslav delegate at
Geneva that: "The question was where and how such special circumstances were enumerated in international law and who could
be charged with interpreting their application.""15 As Judge
S~rensen put it, "[tihe clearer the ad hoc rule, the more auto16
matic its application, the less the seed of discord is sown."'
The evidence may be marshalled below under four heads.
1.

Geographical Considerations

It is clear from the record that exceptional geographical circumstances constitute the main category of special circumstances.
Even before the term had been introduced in the ILC, Professor
Hudson cited an International Law Association (ILA) report,
dated 1950, as having suggested that "factors such as the configuration of the coastline" should be taken into consideration.1 7 Similarly, the comments on draft Article 7 in the 1953 ILC report
referred to the need to make provision for "departures necessitated by any exceptional configuration of the coast.""18
Again, at the 1958 Geneva Conference, the Venezuelan delegate
referred to special circumstances "such as were frequently imposed by geography.""19 Miss Whiteman (United States) spoke of
the need to retain the special circumstances provision because of
the "great variety of complex geographical situations."'20
The most frequent cause of such an exceptional configuration is
6 UNCLOS I OR, CA (35th mtg.) 102, 106, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958); Netherlands: proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/L.62 (1958), reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I
OR, C.4 Annexes 143, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958); and [1969] IC.J. para. 88.
114. Summary Records of the 204th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 124,
128, 129-30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
115. 6 UNCLOS I OR, CA (31st mtg.) 91, 91, U.N. Doc. A/Con. 13/42 (1958).
116. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 119691 I.C.J. 3, 256 (Sorensen, J., dissenting).
117. Summary Records of the 69th Meeting, [1950] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 231,
233, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950 (1958).
118. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 16, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. CoWN'N 200, 216, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add. 1 (1959).
119. 6 UNCLOS I OR, CA (31st mtg.) 91, 92, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958).
120. Id. (32d mtg.) 93, 95.

the presence of islands on the continental shelf. Professor Frangois had already acknowledged in 1953121 that a departure from
the general rule would be necessary, for example, when a small

island opposite one State's coast belonged to another State. Accordingly, the commentary to draft Article 7 of the 1953 ILC report
referred specifically to "the presence of islands" as a possible
cause of special circumstances. 122
If there was agreement that islands might constitute a special

circumstance, there was no agreement as to how account should
be taken of their presence. Commander Kennedy (United King-

dom),123 supported by Miss Whiteman,124 proposed in the Geneva

Conference that islands should be treated on their merits. Very
small islands or sand cays on a continuous continental shelf and
outside the belt of territorial sea might be neglected as base
points for measurement and have only their own appropriate territorial sea. Iran125 and Italy126 favoured ignoring all islands on
the continental shelf, but Miss Whiteman found this proposal too
extreme "in view of the great variety of size, grouping and posi7
tion of islands."12
Another proposal was that islands should be treated like enclaves, with separate continental shelf areas proportional to their
size, thereby leaving unaffected the division of the area between
opposite coasts into equal parts by means of the median line. 128
State practice provides a number of examples of the way in which
deviations from a median-line delimitation have been made to al29
low for special circumstances created by islands.1
121. Summary Records of the 204th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 124,
128, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959). See also the remarks of Professor
Spiropoulos, Summary Records of the 208th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
150, 152, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
122. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 16, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. Com'N 200, 216, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add. 1 (1959).
123. 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 (32d mtg.) 93, 93, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958).
124. Id. at 95.
125. Id. (31st mtg.) 91, 92; Iran: proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/L.60 (1958),
reprintedin 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 Annexes 142, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958).
126. 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 (32d mtg.) 93, 93, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958); Italy:
proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/L.25/Rev. 1 (1958), reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I
OR, C.4 Annexes 133, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958). See also UNESCO, Scientific
Considerations Relating to the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/2 & Add. 1
(1957), reprinted in 1 UNCLOS I OR, PREPARATORY DOCU=ENTS 39, para. 12, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 13/37 (1959).
127. 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 (32d mtg.) 93, 95, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958).
128. See E. BROWN, supra note 60, at 64 n.142.
129. The position of islands is considered in L. HENKIN, LAW FOR THE SEA'S MmERAL REsouRcEs 43 n.129 (1968); Ely, Seabed BoundariesBetween Coastal States:
The Effect to be Given Islets as 'Special Circumstances,' 6 IN'L LAW. 219 (1972);
Goldie, The InternationalCourt of Justice's 'NaturalProlongation'and the Conti-
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A second example of exceptional geographical circumstances
that seems to have been accepted as constituting a special circumstance is well illustrated by the Iranian coast. The existence
of extensive sedimentary mud flats apparently makes identification of the low-water line very difficult. The Iranian delegation in
the Geneva Conference accordingly sought to have it specifically
provided in Article 72 that in such circumstances the boundary of
the continental shelf should be measured from the high-water
mark.130 Commander Kennedy remarked that the high-water
mark was also subject to change,131 and Miss Whiteman rejected
the plea for specific reference in the Convention. However, Miss
Whiteman also described such cases as being in any event fully
covered by the reference to special circumstances.132 Moreover,
when the Iranian government ratified the Geneva Convention
subject to a reservation designed to ensure such an interpretation
33
of "special circumstances," no protest was made.1
The next question that must be considered is this: In the absence of islands or mud flats, what type of exceptional configuration may constitute a special circumstance? Two extreme views
may indicate the scope for disagreement.
In the German pleadings in the North Sea Cases it was argued
that:
"Special circumstances" are always present should the situation display
not inconsiderable divergencies from the normal case. The normal case, in
which the application of the equidistance method leads to a just and equitable apportionment, is a more or less straight coastline, so that the areas
of the shelf apportioned through the equidistance boundary more or less
correspond to the shorelines (facades) of the adjacent States. Should this
not be the case, and should therefore no equitable and appropriate
solu34
tion result, the clause of the "special circumstances" applies.1
nental Shelf Problem of Islands, [1973] 4 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 237; Whiteman, Conference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, 52 AM. J. INT'L
L. 629, 651-53 (1958).
130. 6 UNCLOS I OR, CA (31st mtg.) 91, 92, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958).
131. Id. (32d mtg.) 93, 93.
132. Id. at 95.
133. Counter-Memorial of Denmark, 1 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J.
Pleadings 157, 230-33 (1968).
134. Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1 North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, I.CJ. Pleadings 13, 68-69 (1968). See also Oral Pleadings, 2 North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings 7, 50:
Any geographical factor which diverts the course of the equidistance
boundary between two States in such a manner as to cause the allocation
of considerable areas of the continental shelf to one State which is necessarily classified as a natural continuation of the territory of a second State,

The court's adoption of the theory
vanced by German counsel, is similar.
"the factors to be taken into account"
tions between neighbouring States "are

of macrogeography, adThus, as has been seen,
in the course of negotiato include"

the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimitation carried out in accordance with equidistance principles ought to bring
about between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to
the coastal State and the length of its coast measured in the general direction of the coastline, account being taken for this purpose of the effects,
shelf delimitations between
actual or prospective, of any other continental
135
adjacent States in the same region.

This proposition is not very far removed from Judge Padilla
Nervo's finding that:
[I]t appears that this particular case, that of an internal sea, was not contemplated when the text of Article 6 was drafted. Neither paragraph 1 nor
paragraph 2 of Article 6 have made provision for the overlaps which may
arise from the simultaneous existence of median and lateral equidistance
lines where there are both opposite and adjacent States in a particular internal sea. It appears therefore that the case of the North Sea, so far as
concerned, could be
the situation of the Parties to the present dispute is136
deemed a case in which special circumstances exist.

These views mark one extreme. At the other extreme is the
view of Judge Koretsky who, in his dissenting opinion, held that:
[E]ven if the presence of special circumstances is observed and confirmed, those special circumstances can only justify a deviation from the
normal line if they are located comparatively near to the landward starting-point of the boundary line of the continental shelf adjacent to the terAll "macroritories of the two (and only two) adjacent States ....
geographical" considerations are entirely irrelevant, except in the improba desire to redraw the political map of one or more reable framework of 137
gions of the world.

This view perhaps goes too far. It is submitted that the most
reasonable interpretation of the scope of "special circumstances"
in relation to exceptional geographicalconfiguration is that advanced in the pleadings on behalf of the Danish and Netherlands
governments and summed up in the following passages:
The legal concept of special circumstances has found expression in the
Convention in the form that special circumstances are to be taken into account only when they justiJfy another boundary line. If Article 6 is applied
as a rule of law this must necessarily mean that the correction of the equidistance principle which the clause clearly intends, can take place only if
deviation from the equidistance line is justified towards both States-i.e.,
the State which "gains"and the State which "loses" by the correction.
...
It seems thus legitimate to interpret the "special circumstances"
clause to the effect that it can be invoked againsta State whose continental
shelf boundary under the equidistance principle reflects projecting geo-

then such a factor must be regarded as a special circumstance within the
meaning of Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Convention.
135. [1969] LC.J. 3, para. 101.
136. Id. at 90 (emphasis original) (Padilla Nervo, J., separate opinion).
137. Id. at 162 (emphasis original) (Koretsky, J., dissenting).
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graphicalfeatures (primarilycertain islands and peninsulas) whereas it
cannot be applied againsta State whose continental shelf has a solid geographicalconnection with the territoryof that State thereby constituting a
natural continuation of the territory of the State in conformity with the
138
general geographicalsituation.

Subject to reservations about the use of the word "natural" in
this context, this proposition seems closely in accord with both
the language of Article 6 and the record reviewed above.
2. Mineral Deposits
References have frequently been made to the economic value of
proven deposits of minerals, or to the possession of special mineral exploitation rights, or to the unity of deposits as being factors
that might constitute special circumstances.
Professor Hudson alluded in the ILC to "the economic value of
proven deposits of minerals" as another factor suggested in the
ILA Committee's 1950 report as being relevant to the issue of delimitation.139 It is noticeable, however, that no reference to mineral deposits was incorporated in the commentary to the ILC
report in either its 1953 or its 1956 versions. Because the commentary was in part at least intended to satisfy Professor Lauterpacht's request for greater clarity as to the scope of special
circumstances,140 it would seem reasonable to suppose that the
ILC did not intend to extend the concept to cover this question.
Professor Mouton, in his Hague Lectures in 1954, referred to the
existence of common deposits situated across the mathematical
boundary as constituting a special circumstance.141 Further references are to be found in the Geneva Conference debates.
Commander Kennedy, for example, referred to the special circumstance of "the possession by one of the two States concerned
of special mineral exploitation rights."142
The court in the North Sea Cases mentioned natural resources
"so far as known or readily ascertainable" as a factor to be taken
into account in the negotiations between the parties. 43 Why this
138. Common Rejoinder of Denmark and the Netherlands, 1 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings 453, 526-27 (1968) (emphasis original).
139. Summary Records of the 69th Meeting, [1950] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 231,
233, U.N. DoC. A/CN.4/SER-A/1950 (1958).
140. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
141. Mouton, The ContinentalShelf, 85 HAGUE RECUEIL 420 (1954).
142. 6 UNCLOS I OR, CA (32d mtg.) 93, 93, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958). See
also Mr. Carbajal (Uruguay), id. at 95.
143. [1969] LC.J. 3, para. 101.

should have been included in an enumeration of factors that
would contribute to an equitable solution is not clear. It goes
without saying that the parties are free, on a consensual basis, to
make whatever provisions they please for the economic or convenient exploitation of a common deposit, either by joint exploitation or otherwise. The existence of the deposit would scarcely
seem to constitute a "special circumstance," however, entitling a
coastal State to demand a deviation from the equidistance line.
The only situation that would seem to justify reference to natural resources as constituting special circumstances is that where a
coastal State had acquired exclusive rights to such resources independently of, and prior to, the development of the continental
shelf doctrine. For example, if a State's exclusive right to exploit
a sedentary fishery (falling within the definition of natural resources in the Geneva Convention) 44 on the bed of the geological
continental shelf had been established prior to 1945, there might
be an argument for saying, with Judge Jessup,145 that it would be
right to apply the Grisbadarma principle 4 6 of refraining from
modifying a settled state of things-or of regarding the existence
147
of the sedentary fishery as a historical special circumstance.
Apart from the above, Judge Ammoun is surely right in holding
that "if the preservation of the unity of deposit is a matter of concern to the Parties, they must provide for this by a voluntary
agreement... , and this does not fall within the category of a
48
factor or rule of delimitation."'
3.

Navigation and Fishing Rights

Mention has already been made of the possibility that a State
may possess exclusive rights to exploit a continental shelf resource that pre-dates the doctrine of the continental shelf and
thus constitutes a special circumstance in relation to its delimitation.14 9
144. Ie., "organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or
under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with
the seabed or the subsoil." Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(4).
For a discussion of the position of king crabs on the continental shelf off Alaska,
see Johnson, Fishery Developments in the Pacific,in DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA 1958-1964, at 133, 143-45 (1965). See also Goldie, Sedentary Fisheriesand
Article 2(4) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf-A Plea for a Separate
Regime, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 86, 92-93 (1969); Windley, InternationalPracticeRegarding 7raditional Fishing Privileges of Foreign Fishermen in Zones of Extended
Maritime Jurisdiction,63 AM. . INT'L L. 490 (1969).

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

[1969] I.C.J. 3, 79 (Jessup, J., separate opinion).
See note 159 and accompanying text infra.
See § VI(B) (4) infra.
[1969] LCJ. 3, 149 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion).
See text accompanying note 144 supra.
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Apart from this situation, it seems likely that many of the references to navigation and to fishing rights recorded below are the
result of rather automatic repetition of propositions first stated in
relation to the somewhat different problem of delimiting the territorial sea.
The origin of inany of the subsequent references appears to
have been the following passage in the Answer given by the Committee of Experts to the ILC Rapporteur's question on delimitation of the territorialsea between opposite coasts: "There may,
however, be special reasons, such as navigation and fishing rights,
which may divert the boundary from the median line."150
Although, as has been seen, Professor Frangois made it clear151
that these remarks referred only to the territorial sea, and that
navigation and fishing rights in the continental shelf area were
protected by Article 5 of the ILC's draft,152 it remains true that in
the commentary to Article 72 (both in the 1953 and the 1956 ILC
reports), reference was made to departures from the equidistance
line necessitated by the presence of navigable channels.153 Moreover, Commander Kennedy, a distinguished member of the Committee of Experts and a member of the United Kingdom
delegation to UNCLOS I, specifically referred in the UNCLOS
Fourth Committee to "the possession by one of the two States
concerned of... fishery rights, or the presence of a navigable
channel" as being "[olther types of special circumstances." 5 4
Judge Padilla Nervo went further. "In addition to special situations of a technical nature-navigable channels, cables, safety or
defence requirements, protection of fisheries (fish banks), indivisible deposits of mineral oil or natural gas, etc.-special geographical situations such as special coastal configurations have been
regarded as special circumstances." 55
150. Counter-Memorial of Denmark, 1 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J.
Pleadings 157, 257 (1968).
151. Summary Records of the 204th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. Comnm'N 124,
127, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1953 (1959).
152. See now Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 5.
153. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 44, U.N. Doe. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COs'N 253, 300, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER-A/1956/Add. 1 (1957); Report of
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 9) 16, U.N. Doe. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. INr'L L. CoMM'N 200,
216, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add. 1 (1959).
154. 6 UNCLOS I OR, CA (32d mtg.) 93, 93, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958).
155. [1969] I.CJ. 3, 93 (Padilla Nervo, J., separate opinion). This passage is in

Despite these references, the truth seems to be that during the
earlier period of the development of the continental shelf doctrine, it was recognised (1) that delimitation of the continental
shelf between neighbouring States should take account of special
coastal configurations and (2) that provision must be made for the
protection of existing interests such as fishing, navigation, and
submarine cables. In the course of the later development of the
doctrine, however, provision was made for the latter interests by
specific inclusion in the Geneva Convention. 156 It is precisely the
function of Articles 3 to 5 of the Convention to effect a reconciliation between these various interests and those of the coastal
15 7
State.
4.

Historical Special Circumstances

Although Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf lacks the specific references to historical special circumstances that are to be found in the Territorial Sea Convention,15 8
it would seem that the general term "special circumstances" was
intended to embrace such circumstances.
In reality, however, historical special circumstances will very
seldom be relevant to delimitation of the continental shelf as distinct from delimitation of the territorial sea. Thus, for example,
when certain waters are recognised as possessing the status of a
historic bay or of other historic waters, the baseline of the territorial sea will be extended to encompass these waters. The continental shelf delimitation, however, will be made not by reference
to historical special circumstances but rather to the baseline of
the territorial sea determined by those historical circumstances.
Once again, however, the position of sedentary fisheries may require separate consideration. If title has been acquired to such a
fishery (or indeed to any other natural resource of the seabed or
fact an unacknowledged quotation from the Memorial of the Federal Republic of
Germany, 1 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, LCJ. Pleadings 13, 69 (1968).
156. Supra note 4, arts. 4-5.
157. But see the French reservation to id. art. 6, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY FUNCTONS, LIST
OF SIGNATURES, RATIFICATIONS, ETC. AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1977, at 540, U.N. Doc.

ST/LEG/SER.D/l1 (1978). It would appear that France interprets "special circumstances" as covering fishing and navigation interests.
158. Article 12 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T..A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205,

refers to variations from the equidistance line "by reason of historic title or other
special circumstances," and Article 4(4), id., permits account to be taken of "eco-

nomic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of
which are clearly evidenced by a long usage" -but only in determining particular
baselines in a straight-baseline system justified by the geographical configuration
of the coast.
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subsoil) in the area of what is now recognised as the continental
shelf but prior to the establishment of that doctrine, then it is arguable that the preservation of such rights should require a
modification of the equidistance line of delimitation.
Judge Jessup drew attention to an intermediate position in his
separate opinion in the North Sea Cases. He referred to the conclusions of the Arbitral Tribunal in the GrisbadarnaCasei5 9 that
in the law of nations, it is a well established principle that it is necessary
to refrain as far as possible from modifying the state of things existing in
fact and for a long time; that principle has a very particular application
when private interests are in question, which, once disregarded, can not
be preserved in an effective manner even by any sacrifices of the State, to
which those interested belong .... 160

Judge Jessup commented that "[cionsidering the rapidity of
the progress of exploitation in the petroleum industry in the
North Sea, no restrictive limit should be placed on the elapsed
time." 16 1 He admitted that the
existence of actual drilling or exploitation in a certain place cannot be
considered in the present circumstances to base a title on prescription, or
on prior use or occupation; nor is it to be assimilated to "historic title"
circumstance" in Article 12 of the 1958
which is mentioned as a "special 162
Convention on the Territorial Sea.

Nevertheless he thought that the parties "might well bear in
mind" the provisions in the Anglo-Venezuelan Treaty of 1897 that
"such effect shall be given to such occupation as reason, justice,
the principles of international law, and the equities of the case
shall. . . require."16 3
Certain alleged cases of historical special circumstances were
referred to in the pleadings in the North Sea Cases. Thus it was
argued in the Netherlands Counter-Memorial that part of the maritime boundary between Finland and the Soviet Union laid down
in the Agreement of May, 1965,164 being governed by the provisions of the Peace Treaties of 1940165 and 1947,166 reflected a special circumstance already existing when the Agreement of 1965
159. (Norway v. Sweden), [19161 1 Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 121 (1909).
160. [1969] I.C.J. 3, 79-80 (Jessup, J., separate opinion).
161. Id. at 80.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Agreement on Boundaries of Sea Waters and Continental Shelf in the Gulf
of Finland, May 20, 1965, Finland-Soviet Union, 566 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in 6 NT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS

727 (1967).

165. Peace Treaty of Mar. 12, 1940, Finland-Soviet Union.
166. Treaty of Peace with Finland, signed Feb. 10, 1947, 48 U.N.T.S. 203.

was concluded.167
Similarly, the two most landward points of the boundary lines
established by the Agreement of July 24, 1968, between Norway
and Sweden168 were fixed by reference to the line established by
the Grisbadarnaaward. As the Common Rejoinder of the Danish
and Netherlands governments put it, "in other words, by reference to a historic 'special circumstance.' '169
In this sense, the German view that "special circumstances" in70 is
clude "any exceptional delimitations of territorial waters"'
similar.
5. Conclusion
While it would obviously be wrong, on the basis of the above evidence, to attempt to draw up a closed list of cases of 9pecial circumstances, it would be equally unjustifiable to ignore the fact
that this evidence clearly suggests that the concept of "special circumstances" is much more limited in scope than the principle of
equity as interpreted by the court in the North Sea Cases. It is
submitted that the above analysis provides a set of guidelines by
reference to which it may be ascertained whether considerations
invoked by a party as constituting special circumstances may
properly be so regarded.
C. The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case
1. Relationship Between Article 6 and International
Customary Law
In its Decision in the Anglo-French ContinentalShelf Case, the
Court of Arbitration referred extensively both to the rules of international customary law as interpreted by the I.C.J. in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases and to the provisions of Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention. In several passages, the Court of Arbitration indicated its view on the relationship between the two.
It had been argued by France that the Geneva Convention was
now obsolete. The court rejected this contention but, having de167. Counter-Memorial of the Netherlands, 1 North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, I.CJ. Pleadings 307, para. 96 (1968).

168. Common Rejoinder of Denmark and the Netherlands, 1 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings 453, 554 (1968).
169. Id. para. 64.
170. 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 (33d mtg.) 96, 98, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958) (remarks of Prof. Munch). For argument that the boundaries fixed in the agreements
between Germany and the Netherlands (December 1, 1964) and Germany and
Denmark (June 9, 1965) take account of such a special circumstance, see CounterMemorial of the Netherlands, 1 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings 307, para. 100 (1968).
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clared that the Convention was in force between the parties, went
on to say that this finding
does not mean that it regards itself as debarred from taking any account
in these proceedings of recent developments in customary law. On the
contrary, the Court has no doubt that it should take due account of the
sea in so far as this may be relevant in the conevolution of the law of the
171

text of the present case.

The court spelled out the implications of this statement in more
detail in a later passage:
[T]he Court considers that Article 6 is applicable in principle, to the delimitation of the continental shelf as between the Parties under the Arbitration Agreement. This does not, however, mean that the Court
considers the rules of customary law discussed in the judgment in the
North Sea ContinentalShelf cases to be inapplicable in the present case.
As already pointed out, the provisions of Article 6 do not define the conditions for the application of the equidistance-special circumstances rule;
moreover, the equidistance-special circumstances rule and the rules of
customary law have the same object-the delimitation of the boundary in
accordance with equitable principles. In the view of this Court, therefore,
the rules of customary law are a relevant and even essential means both
for interpreting and completing the provisions of Article 6.172

It is of course true that circumstances that would constitute
"sspecial circumstances" in accordance with the guidelines
analysed above would also constitute "factors creative of inequity" under international customary law. It is submitted, however, that the converse is not true. Factors that might be held to
be creative of inequity in accordance with the rules expounded by
the I.C.J. would not necessarily fall within the narrower guidelines relating to special circumstances under Article 6. Thus, the
fact that the Court of Arbitration could truly say that the effect of
applying or of not applying Article 6 would make very little, if
any, practical difference to the boundary line in the circumstances
of this case173 proves nothing about the relationship between the
rules of Article 6 and those of international customary law.
In another passage, the court said that: "The double basis on
which both Parties put their case regarding the Channel Islands
confirms the Court's conclusion that the different ways in which
the requirements of 'equitable principles' or the effects of 'special
circumstances' are put reflect differences of approach and terminology rather than of substance."1 74
171.
172.
173.
174.

Decision, supra note 7, para. 48.
Id. para. 75.
Id. para. 65.
Id. para. 148.

Once again, this may be an acceptable statement in the circumstances of this case. If it was intended to be of general validity,
however, it goes too far. There are grounds for believing that the
court did intend it to be of general application. Thus, it not only
regarded the rules of international customary law as "essential
means both for interpreting and completing the provisions of Article 6";175 it also referred, in connection with the special circumstances rule, to considerations that clearly do not fall within the
guidelines identified above.
The court had come to the prima facie view that the existence
of the Channel Islands close to the French coast, if permitted to
divert the course of the mid-Channel median line, would effect a
radical distortion of the boundary, creative of inequity. It went on
to test this prima facie conclusion by applying the equidistancespecial circumstances rule of Article 6. It was concerned, in this
connection, to see whether a departure from the median line was
"justified" in relation to both parties and in the light of all the
"relevant circumstances." 7 6 Among the "relevant circumstances"
invoked by the United Kingdom and accepted by the court "as
carrying a certain weight" were the following: (1) the particular
character of the Channel Islands as populous islands of a certain
political and economic importance, (2) the close ties between the
Islands and the United Kingdom, (3) the latter's responsibility for
their defence and security, and (4) the impossibility of the Islands having any appreciable area of continental shelf except in
the open waters to their west and north.177
While it is true that these circumstances were allowed to have
only a very minor effect on the boundary line, the court's reasoning does indicate how wide it considered the category of factors
relevant to special circumstances to be. In the writer's opinion,
Professor Briggs was right to express his concern-in his separate
declaration-that the court's interpretation of Article 6 "constitutes some threat that the rule of positive law expressed in Article 6 will be eroded by its identification with subjective equitable
principles, permitting attempts by the Court to redress the ineq8
uities of geography."17
The approach of the Court of Arbitration is particularly well illustrated by its treatment of defence and security interests. The
French government had argued that the application of the equidistance method in the Channel Islands region would be inequita175. Id. para. 75.
176. Id. para. 197.

177. Id.
178. Id. at 236.
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ble, inter alia, because it would involve severing the continental
shelf of France into two zones separated by a United Kingdom
zone. This severance, in turn, would be prejudicial to the vital interests of France in the security and defence of its territory.
France referred in particular to the fact that it would be deprived
of any right to control activities in the whole Hurd Deep Zone and
that this deprivation would involve serious inconveniences and
risks for French submarines stationed at Cherbourg as well as affecting the French Republic's military supervision of the ap79
proaches to its territory.
The United Kingdom, though as a matter of advocacy invoking
similar defence and navigational interests for itself and seeking to
refute the factual basis of the French claim, argued that France's
security, defence, and navigational interests were not entitled to
be given weight. The United Kingdom pointed out that the
French argument did not take account of the legal protection
given to those interests by the regime of the continental shelf itself, especially Articles 3 to 5 of the Geneva Convention.180
The Court of Arbitration took an intermediate position. In its
view,
the weight of such considerations in this region is, in any event, somewhat
diminished by the very particular character of the English Channel as a
major route of international maritime navigation serving ports outside the
territories of either of the Parties. Consequently, they cannot be regarded
by the Court as exercising a decisive influence on the delimitation of the
boundary in the present case. They may support and strengthen, but they
cannot negative, any conclusions that are already indicated by the geographical, political and legal circumstances of the region which the Court
181
has identified.

In other words, the court was prepared in principle to regard
such matters as relevant to the question of equity or special circumstances, though in the context of this case it allowed very little weight to be attributed to them.
In the writer's opinion, the above analysis of the meaning of
special circumstances suggests that such matters do not come
within the scope of this concept.
179. Id. paras. 161-63.
180. Id. paras. 175-76.
181. Id. para. 188.

2. The Status of the Principle of Equidistance Under Article
6 and the Question of the Burden of Proof of
Special Circumstances
The Court of Arbitration was obliged to consider the question
posed in the heading above because of the United Kingdom's contention that the onus of proof lay upon France to show that special circumstances existed. Before examining the court's opinion,
it is enlightening first to review the travaux pr~paratoires of Article 6.
a.

The Travaux Pr6paratoiresof Article 6

The travaux pr~paratoires of Article 6 throw some light on the
proper characterisation of the principle of equidistance as incorporated in Article 6. The relevant records are those relating to the
debate that took place in the 1953 ILC session, though, of course,
the ILC had already considered the matter at some length in previous sessions.182 Prior to this session, the ILC Rapporteur, Professor Frangois, had convened a Committee of Experts to advise
on technical questions raised by delimitation of (primarily) the
territorial sea. In its report,183 the Committee of Experts added a
comment to the effect that, in relation to questions VI and VII (international boundaries between opposite and adjacent coasts respectively), the Committee had considered it important to find a
formula that could also be used for the delimitation of the respective continental shelves of two States bordering the same continental shelf.
For opposite coasts the Committee recommended "the median
line, every point of which is equidistant from the baselines of the
States concerned." It added that: "There may, however, be special reasons, such as navigation and fishing rights, which may di84
vert the boundary from the median line."1
For adjacent coasts the Committee recommended that the lateral boundary, if not already fixed otherwise, should be drawn ac182. See E. BROWN, supra note 60, at 52-57.
183. Rapport du ComitO d'experts sur certaines questions d'ordre technique con-

cernant la mer territoriale,in Additif au deuxi~me rapport de MJ.P.A. Francois,
rapporteurspecial app., U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/61/Add. 1 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2
Y.B. IN'5L L. ComM'N 75, 77, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add. 1 (1959). The re-

port is reproduced in English at Counter-Memorial of Denmark, 1 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, LCJ. Pleadings 157, 254 (1968).
184. Though the discussions of the Committee are not recorded, Professor
Frangois, who chaired its meetings, has confirmed that these latter considerations
referred to the territorial sea and that navigation and fishing rights in the Continental Shelf were protected by Article 5 of the Commission's draft. Summary
Records of the 204th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.COMM'N 124, 127, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959). See Geneva Convention, supra note 4, art. 5.
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cording to the principle of equidistance from the respective
coastlines. It added, however, that: "In a number of cases this
may not lead to an equitable solution, which should then be arrived at by negotiation."185
In the light of this report, Professor Frangois presented a new
draft Article 7.186 For opposite coasts he proposed that the boundary should be "the median line every point of which is equidistant
from the two opposite coasts"; and, for adjacent States, the
boundary was to be drawn "according to the principle of equidistance."187 In neither case was any reference made to either agreement or special circumstances. The draft did, however, provide
for arbitration if parties could not agree on how the lines were to
be drawn in accordance with this principle. It was on the basis of
this draft that the Commission's crucial debate took place during
the 1953 session. Because the formula that emerged from that debate is in its essentials that of the present Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention, it is useful to refer in some detail to a few of the key
contributions to the debate.
The element of agreement was re-introduced by Professor Pal,
who proposed the addition of the words "unless otherwise amicably determined by them."188 Similarly, the element of exceptional
situations was re-introduced by Professor Sandstrbm, and the
Rapporteur agreed that there were cases when a departure from
the general rule was necessary-for example, when a small island
near one State's coast belonged to another State.189 Admitting,
therefore, that, although a general rule was necessary, it was also
necessary to provide exceptions to it, the Rapporteur suggested a
further formulation referring to agreement or to the median line
"as a general rule."190
Professor Lauterpacht objected, however, that it was arguable
that the words "as a general rule" would deprive the rule of its
185. Summary Records of the 204th Meeting, [19531 1 Y.B. INT'L L. ComnI'N 124,
127, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1953 (1959).
186. Summary Records of the 201st Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 103,
106, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).

187. Id.
188. Summary Records of the 204th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COM'N 124,
125, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
189. Id. at 128, para. 37. An excellent example is provided by the boundary between Colombia and Venezuela in the Gulf of Venezuela. See Boggs, Delimitation
of Seaward Areas Under NationalJurisdiction,45 Am. J. INT'L L. 240, 261-63 (1951).
190. Summary Records of the 204th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COmM'N 124,
128, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).

legal character. He suggested that the commentary on the draft
article might contain a full explanation, giving specific instances
of cases in which a departure from the rule was permissible.191
He also was unhappy with the formula proposed by Professor
Spiropoulos: "unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances."192 "If the Commission had certain specific exceptions in mind, [Professor Lauterpacht felt that] it should say so.
But to state generally that arbitrators should take exceptions into
consideration was tantamount to giving them the power to judge
ex aequo et bono, which the Commission did not intend to do."193
However, Professor Spiropoulos persisted with his amendment,
revised to read: "unless special circumstances justify another delimitation."194
In a final effort to achieve greater precision, Professor Lauterpacht proposed the following formula: "In cases in which such delimitation is physically impossible or in which it may cause undue
hardship to one of the coastal States, the line shall be determined
by arbitration in a manner approximatingas closely as possible to
the principle of equidistance."195 Subsequently, however, Professor Lauterpacht withdrew this amendment "provided an explicit
reference were included in the comments to the extent of the lati96
tude to be given to arbitrators."1
As adopted by the ILC in 1953,197 Article 7 thus included reference to three elements: (1) agreement, (2) the principle of equidistance, and (3) "unless another boundary line is justified by
special circumstances."1 98
191. Id. para. 47, at 129-30, para. 61.
192. Id. at 130, para. 62.
193. Summary Records of the 205th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INr'L L. ComM'N 130,
131, para. 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
194. Id. at 132, para. 29. He argued that, because the Commission had accepted

the principle of arbitration, it must be left to the arbitrators to assess the special
circumstances. Elsewhere, he said that his proposal would enable arbitrators to
settle disputes ex aequo et bono. For instance, in cases in which an island belonged to one State but was situated in the territorial waters of another, arbitrators would have to judge ex aequo et bono. Id. para. 21. He considered that: "His
formula made it perfectly clear that only in cases where the application of the rule
would lead to manifest unfairness would it have to be waived." Id. at 133, para. 39.
195. Id. at 132, para. 23 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 133, para. 34.
197. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 13, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. Comm'IN 200, 213, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add. 1 (1959).
198. Id. Article 7 read.
1. Where the same continental shelf is contiguous to the territories of
two or more States whose coasts are opposite to each other, the boundary
of the continental shelf appertaining to such States is, in the absence of
agreement between those States or unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the median line every point of which is
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In the ILC's comments on the draft articles, it was stated that:
Moreover, while in the case of both kinds of boundaries [between opposite States and between adjacent States] the rule of equidistance is the
general rule, it is subject to modification in cases in which another boundary line is justified by special circumstances. As in the case of the boundaries of coastal waters, provision must be made for departures
necessitated by any exceptional configuration of the coast, as well as the
presence of islands or of navigable channels. To that extent the rule
adopted partakes of some elasticity. In view of the general arbitration
clause of article 8 ... no special provision was considered necessary for
submitting any resulting disputes to arbitration. Such arbitration, while
expected to take into account the special circumstances calling for modification of the major principle of equidistance, is not contemplated as arbitration ex aequo et bono. That major principle must constitute the basis
of arbitration, conceived as settlement on the basis of law, subject to reasonable modifications necessitated by the special circumstances of the
case. 1 9 9

Article 8 provided: "Any disputes which may arise between States
concerning the interpretation or application of these articles
should be submitted to arbitration at the request of any of the
parties."

2 00

The substance of Article 7, as adopted in 1953, was incorporated
in the reformulated Article 72 in the final report of the ILC in
1956.201 As, however, the reference to arbitration in Article 8 of
equidistant from the base lines from which the width of the territorial sea
of each country is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is contiguous to the territories of
two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to
such States is, in the absence of agreement between those States or unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the base lines
from which the width of the territorial sea of each of the two countries is
measured.
199. Id. at 16, reprintedin [19531 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 216.
200. Id. at 13, reprinted in [19531 2 Y.B. IN-r'L L. Comm'N at 213.
201. The text of Article 7 (1953) is in note 198 supra. Article 72 (1956) read:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two
or more States whose coasts are opposite to each other, the boundary of
the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is
the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each country is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two
adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined
by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary
shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each of the
two countries is measured.
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.

the 1953 draft was replaced by reference to the I.C.J. in Article 73
of the 1956 draft,202 the commentary to Article 72 differed from its

1953 equivalent. Paragraph (1) read as follows:
For the determination of the limits of the continental shelf the Commission adopted the same principles as for the articles 12 and 14 concerning
the delimitation of the territorial sea. As in the case of the boundaries of
the territorial sea, provision must be made for departures necessitated by
any exceptional configuration of the coast, as well as the presence of iscase may arise fairly often, so that
lands or of navigable channels. 2This
03
the rule adopted is fairly elastic.

While it is true that this relatively shorter commentary omits
the emphasis in the 1953 report on the "major principle of equidistance" as constituting the basis of a legal settlement, nothing in
the 1956 debates suggests that the omission reflected a change in
the Commission's position. It seems rather that it disappeared together with the general reference to arbitration.
The 1958 Geneva Conference revised the ILC's draft Article 72
only to a very minor extent. The changes incorporated in what
then became Article 6 of the Geneva Convention are irrelevant in
the present context.
Reviewing this record, it would seem fair to say that:
1. The Committee of Experts regarded the principle of equidistance as the general rule, while noting that it would have to admit
of exceptions where there were "special reasons" or where its application would "not lead to an equitable solution."
2. The International Law Commission, in its crucial 1953 session, conducted its debate on the assumption that the principle of
equidistance was "the general rule" and referred to it also as "the
major principle of equidistance." "Modifications necessitated by
the special circumstances of the case" were very clearly regarded
as exceptions to the major principle.
3. Although the shorter commentary in the ILC 1956 report
omits reference to "the major principle of equidistance" and does
note that the case for a departure from the equidistance principle
"may arise fairly often," nothing in the record of the ILC debate
suggests that the ILC had ceased to regard the equidistance principle as "the general rule" or "the major principle."
4. The 1958 Geneva Conference, having made no relevant
change to the ILC's draft Article, may be taken to have endorsed
the Commission's view as to the status of the equidistance principle.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 44, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprintedin [1956] 2 Y.B. Lv'L L
Comm'N 253, 300, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957).
202. Id.
203. Id. art. 72 commentary (1).
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The conclusion must be, therefore, that the travaux
pr~paratoires provide strong evidence that the intention of the
parties to the Geneva Convention was that the equidistance principle of Article 6 should be regarded as "the general rule" or "the
major principle" and that the special circumstances rule was regarded as being an exception to the general rule.
It is submitted that the classification of the equidistance principle as "the general rule" or "the major principle" means that
there is a presumption in favour of the rule; that it is the residual
rule; that the onus lies on those pleading exceptions to it to prove
the presence of special circumstances. Nor need this conclusion
be disturbed if, following the Court of Arbitration, one regards Article 6 as having formulated a combined equidistance-special circumstances rule rather than two separate rules.
b.

The Decision of the Court of Arbitration

The Court of Arbitration adopted a different view of the status
of the principle of equidistance. The United Kingdom had argued
that Article 6(1) placed an onus of proof upon France to show the
existence of any special circumstances on which it relied and to
show that these circumstances justified a boundary other than
the median line as defined by that paragraph. 20 4 The Court of Arbitration considered, however, that this view did not place the
equidistance principle in its true perspective and went on as follows:
Article 6, as both the United Kingdom and the French Republic stress in
the pleadings, does not formulate the equidistance principle and "special
circumstances" as two separate rules. The rule there stated in each of the
two cases is a single one, a combined equidistance-special circumstances
rule. This being so, it may be doubted whether, strictly speaking, there is
any legal burden of proof in regard to the existence of special circumstances. The fact that the rule is a single rule means that the question
whether "another boundary is justified by special circumstances" is an integral part of the rule providing for application of the equidistance principle. As such, although involving matters of fact, that question is always
one of law of which, in case of submission to arbitration, the tribunal must
itself, propriomotu, take cognisance when applying Article 6.205

For the reasons stated above, the Court of Arbitration's view on
the legal burden of proof does not seem to be in accordance with
the intention of the parties to the Geneva Convention; nor does
the court appear to be certain of its own view. It says only that "it
204. Decision, supra note 7, para. 67.
205. Id. para. 68.

may be doubted whether, strictly speaking, there is any legal bur206
den of proof."
Professor Briggs also refers briefly to this point in the declaration that he appended to the decision of the Court of Arbitration.
Professor Briggs stated that:
The view that Article 6 is expressive of customary international law-a
view already held by some Judges of the International Court of Justice in
1969 in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases-has been substantially
strengthened by the subsequent practice of States,
which has been elabo20 7
rately analyzed by counsel in this Arbitration.

Professor Briggs agreed with the court that whether it applied the
principles of international customary law or those set forth in Article 6 of the Convention would make little practical difference "in
the circumstances of this case."20 8 He went on to say, however,

that:
My principal concern in this respect is that the Court's interpretation of
Article 6 seems, in effect, to shift "the burden of proof' of "special circumstances" from the State which invokes them to the Court itself, and constitutes some threat that the rule of positive law expressed in Article 6 will
be eroded by its identification with subjective equitable principles, 2permit09
ting attempts by the Court to redress the inequities of geography.

That the writer shares this opinion will be evident from the following excerpt from a critical review, published in 1971, of the
LC.J.'s judgment in the North Sea ContinentalShelf Cases:
In the writer's view, the record surveyed above amply verifies that in
the course of a development over nearly a quarter of a century, the rules
expressed in Article 6(2) of the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf have attained the status of international customary law. Two points
must be emphasised. First, in view of the fact that both the German
pleadings and the Court's Judgment concentrated on the question
whether the evidence sufficed to prove the equidistance rule, it is necessary to emphasise that Article 6(2) contains three elements-agreement,
equidistance and special circumstances. It is submitted that the latter two
elements have now been accepted in State practice as being the rules the
application of which will ensure that, failing agreement between the parties, a delimitation will be carried out in accordance with the "equitable
principles" referred to in the Truman Proclamation.
Secondly, the assertion is not that State practice since 1958 (or 1964,
when the Convention entered into force) has transformed the conventional rules into rules of international customary law but rather that, as a
result of a process of refinement and consolidation of which the conclusion of the Convention was a part, the fundamental but vague notions of
agreement and equity expressed in the Truman Proclamation were transformed into at least relatively more precise rules.
Primafacie, the difference between this conclusion and the Court's
Judgment may seem slight. It is submitted, however, that the concept of
special circumstances is much more limited in scope and less open to arbitrary concretisation than the general principle of equity as interpreted
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id. at 236.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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by the Court.2 1 0

That the Court of Arbitration was aware of the greater latitude
it would enjoy as a result of equating the rules of Article 6 with

those of international customary law is clear from its observation
that:
Clearly, this feature of Article 6 [the right to claim the existence of special
circumstances whether or not a reservation with regard to such special
circumstances had been made on ratification of the Convention] further
underlines the full liberty of the Court in appreciating the geographical
and other circumstances relevant to the determination of the continental
shelf boundary, and at the same time reduces the possibility of any difference in the appreciation of these circumstances under Article 6 and customary law.2 1 1

3.

No Legal Limit to Considerations Which May Be Taken
into Account to Ensure the Application of
Equitable Principles

As was noted above, the I.C.J. said in its judgment in the North
Sea Cases that: "[Tihere is no legal limit to the considerations
which States may take account of for the purpose of making sure
that they apply equitable procedures ....
-212 Clearly, if this passage is read in isolation and understood literally, it might be
taken as authority for the invocation of a limitless variety of con-

siderations as constituting factors productive of inequity. It is,
therefore, fortunate that the Court of Arbitration had an opportunity in the Anglo-French Case to interpret this ambiguous and
somewhat misleading passage.
Having decided that the position of the Scilly Isles constituted a
"special circumstance" justifying a boundary other than the strict
median line, the court went on to say that:
It does not, however, consider that the existence of this "special circumstance" in the Atlantic region gives it carte blanche to employ any method
that it chooses in order to effect an equitable delimitation of the continental shelf. The French Republic, it is true, has impressed upon this Court
certain observations in the Judgment in the North Sea ContinentalShelf
cases to the effect that, in order to achieve an equitable solution, "it is necessary to seek, not one method of delimitation but one goal" (paragraph
92), and that 'there is no legal limit to the considerations which States
may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable procedures" (paragraph 93). But in those cases the Parties had retained the actual delimitation of the boundary in their own hands for
further negotiation in the light of the principles and rules to be stated by
210. E. BROWN, supra note 60, at 61-62 (emphasis original).
211. Decision, supra note 7, para. 69.
212. [1969] I.C.J. 3, para. 93. See text accompanying note 102 supra.

the International Court of Justice; and in any event the observations invoked by the French Republic have to be read in the light of certain other
observations of the International Court in the same Judgment. In these
other observations, it was stressed that any recourse to equitable considerations must be to considerations "lying not outside but within the rules"
of law, and that there is no question of any decision ex aequo et bono
(paragraph 88); and, as already noted, it was also stressed that "there can
never be any question of completely refashioning nature" (paragraph
91).213

4. The Proportionality Factor
As has been seen, the I.C.J. held, in its judgment in the North
Sea Cases, that to ensure the application of equitable principles
to the delimitation of the continental shelf, account had to be
taken of
the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation
effected according to equidistance principles ought to bring about between
the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned
and the length of their respective coastlines-these being measured according to their general direction in order to establish the necessary balance between States with straight and those with markedly concave or
coasts or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their truer proporconvex
214
tions.

Earlier in the judgment, the court held that "given a geographical situation of quasi-equality-in the length of the coastal frontages of the three States--one must abate the effects of an
incidental special feature from which an unjustifiable difference
of treatment could result."2 1 5 In an earlier work, the writer suggested that this proposition seemed to rest on three assumptions,
all of which were questionable:
First, the Court isolates one factor-length of coast-and uses this as
the criterion of equitable apportionment. Why not use population, per
capita income, land area, dependence of industry on the natural resources of the shelf, relative poverty of land resources? Secondly, the
shape of the German coast is described as "an incidental special feature,"
though one might well think that the characteristic shape of the whole of
the German North Sea coast is less incidental than the ratio between the
lengths of the coasts of the three States. Thirdly, strict application of the
equidistance principle would, it is said, cause an "unjustifiable difference
in treatment." But, of course, the treatment would only be unjustifiable in
terms of the results to be expected from application of the quasi-equality
doctrine, which would demand reasonable proportionality between coastal
frontage and area of shelf-another assumption.
It will be noted, furthermore, that adoption of the quasi-equality/proportionality test involves acceptance of the so-called macrogeographical perspective advocated by German Counsel. The calculation of
reasonable proportionality of the continental shelves of States A and B by
reference to coastal frontage, may-and in this case does-require a consideration of the shelf of State C, for it is only by reference to State B's
boundary with State C that the area of State B's continental shelf may be
213. Decision, supra note 7, para. 245.
214. [19691 I.C.J. 3, para. 98.
215. Id. paras. 89-91.
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calculated. But, what justification is there for asserting the relevance of
the boundary between States B and C to delimitation of the boundary between A and B? The Court certainly provides none other than its ex
cathedra deduction from equitable principles. In a case before the Court
between A and B, is State C to be bound by the frontier between it and B
which2 1 6the Court uses as a basis for application of the proportionality
rule?

Fortunately, the Court of Arbitration has now reconsidered the
significance of the proportionality factor and has placed it in its
proper perspective. Having recognised that the concept of proportionality was "clearly inherent in the notion of a delimitation in
accordance with equitable principles" and that it thus formed "an
element in the appreciation of the appropriateness of the equidistance or any other method of delimitation, 217 the court went on
to deny that this concept had the character of a specific principle
or rule of delimitation as had been contended by France. It continued:
In particular, this Court does not consider that the adoption in the North
Sea ContinentalShelf cases of the criterion of a reasonable degree of proportionality between the areas of continental shelf and the lengths of the
coastlines means that this criterion is one for application in all cases. On
the contrary, it was the particular geographical situation of three adjoining
States situated on a concave coast which gave relevance to that criterion
in those cases. In the present case, the role of proportionality in the delimitation of the continental shelf is, in the view of this Court, a broader
one, not linked to any specific geographical feature. It is rather a factor to
be taken into account in appreciating the effects of geographical features
on the equitable or inequitable character of a delimitation, and 2in1 8 particular of a delimitation by application of the equidistance method.

The role of the proportionality factor was further specified in

this passage:
[P] articular configurations of the coast or individual geographical features
may, under certain conditions, distort the course of the boundary, and
thus affect the attribution of continental shelf to each State, which would
otherwise be indicated by the general configuration of their coasts. The
concept of "proportionality" merely expresses the criterion or factor by
which it may be determined whether such a distortion results in an inequitable delimitation of the continental shelf as between the coastal States
concerned. The factor of proportionality may appear in the form of the ratio between the areas of continental shelf to [sic] the lengths of the respective coastlines, as in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. But it
may also appear, and more usually does, as a factor for determining the
reasonable or unreasonable-the equitable or inequitable-effects of particular geographical features or configurations upon the course of an equi-

distance-line boundary.2 19

216. E. BROWN, supra note 60, at 50.
217. Decision, supra note 7, para. 98.
218. Id. para. 99.
219. Id. para. 100.

In short, it is disproportion rather than any general principle of proportionality which is the relevant criterion or factor .... Proportionality,
therefore is to be used as a criterion or factor relevant in evaluating the
equities of certain geographical situations, not as a general principle220providing an independent source of rights to areas of continental shelf.

A practical example of the application of the proportionality
factor is furnished by the Court of Arbitration's treatment of the
Scilly Isles. In relation to these islands, the court explained that:
"[Piroportionality" comes into account only in appreciating whether the
Scilly Isles are to be considered a "special circumstance" having distorting
effects on the equidistance boundary as between the French Republic and
the United Kingdom and, if so, the extent of the adjustment appropriate to
abate the inequity. These questions do not therefore require nice calculations of the areas of continental shelf appertaining to the United Kingdom
in the north under a prospective delimitation of its continental shelf
boundary with the Irish Republic. The point here at issue is simply
whether the geographical situation of the Scilly Isles in relation to the
French coast has a distorting effect and is a cause
22 1 of inequity as between
the United Kingdom and the French Republic.

There was thus no question of elaborate calculations of length of
coasts and areas of shelf or of choosing between macrogeographical and microgeographical perspectives. 222 Instead, the court,
having regard to the fact that the Scillies extended the United
Kingdom coastline into the Atlantic twice as far as Ushant extended the French coastline, decided that application of the "halfeffect" method 223 would serve to achieve the necessary abatement
of the inequity so caused. 224
It seems right to conclude that what has survived the court's reconsideration of the "proportionality factor" is simply the unexceptionable proposition that the broad notion of proportionality is
one that may be called in aid to help in establishing whether a
particular feature does constitute special circumstances because
of its unjust distorting effects.
5. Opposite-State and Adjacent-State Situations
Distinguished
Unlike Article 12 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea,22 Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf deals with opposite-State and adjacent-State situations in
separate paragraphs. To the I.C.J., the reason for this was plain.
In an opposite-State situation, "ignoring the presence of islets,
rocks and minor coastal projections, the disproportionally dis220. Id. para. 101.
221. Id. para. 250.
222. Id. para. 166.
223. See id. para. 251 (explanation).
224. Id.
225. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29,
1958, art. 12, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.IA.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
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torting effect of which can be eliminated by other means," 226 a
median line "must effect an equal division of ' 227 the shelf areas

concerned. In the case of "laterally adjacent States on the same
coast with no immediately opposite coast in front of it,"'228 however,
in certain geographical circumstances . . . the equidistance method ...
leads unquestionably to inequity... :
(a)...
Thus it has been seen that in the case of concave or convex coastlines that if the equidistance method is employed, then the greater
the irregularity and the further from the coastline the area
to be de229
limited, the more unreasonable are the results produced.

Obviously, such distortions are comparatively small within the
narrow limits of the territorial sea 230-hence the difference between the delimitational rules in the two Conventions.
The I.C.J.'s somewhat rigid differentiation between the two
types of situations was again apparent in its finding-admittedly
obiter-that Article 6 could not apply to a delimitation between
Denmark and the Netherlands because they were neither "adjacent" nor "opposite" to one another.23 1 The Court of Arbitration,
in its review of this question, has adopted a much broader approach to the interpretation of Article 6, which seems to this
writer to be much more in accordance with the intention of the
parties to the Geneva Convention.
The court divided the "arbitration area" into an "English Channel region" and an "Atlantic region." In relation to the English
Channel region, the court agreed with the view of the parties that
it had to deal with an opposite-States situation and that the appropriate method of delimitation was, in principle, that of equidistance.232 With regard to the Atlantic region, the parties were not
at all in agreement. France argued that because the United Kingdom and France are separated by the Channel, the Atlantic region could not be considered to be an adjacent-States situation;
and that because the Atlantic region lies off the two coasts rather
than between them, it was not an opposite-States situation. It
concluded that it was a situation sui generis and a casus omissus
226.
227.
228.
229.

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] LC.J. 3, para. 57.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 89.

230. Id. para. 59.
231. Id. para. 36.
232. Decision, supra note 7, para. 87.

falling completely outside Article 6 of the Geneva Convention.233
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, contended that Article 6
was intended to deal comprehensively with the delimitation of
the continental shelf and that there could be no question of casus
omissus. Moreover, even though the Atlantic region lay off the
coasts of the two countries, it was still essentially an opposite2
States situation. M
The court endorsed the United Kingdom view that Article 6 was
to be regarded as comprehensive and that all situations must,
therefore, in principle, fall under either paragraph 1 or paragraph
2 of that Article.2 35 It next interpreted the passage in the judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, where the I.C.J.
had noted that: "In certain geographical configurations of which
the Parties furnished examples, a given equidistance line may
partake in varying degree of the nature both of a median and of a
lateral line." 236 What this meant, the Court of Arbitration held,
was that
in determining whether two States are to be considered as "opposite" or
"adjacent," for the purpose of delimiting a continental shelf on which each
of them abuts, the Court must have regard to their actual geographical reand to the continental shelf at any given place along
lation to each 2other
37
the boundary.

The Court of Arbitration cited two further passages from the
judgment in the North Sea Cases, where, as was noted above, the
I.C.J. had said that:
[W]hereas a median line divides equally between the two opposite countries areas that can be regarded as being the natural prolongation of the
territory of each of them, a lateral equidistance line often leaves to one of
areas that are a natural prolongation of the territory
the States concerned
238
of the other

and had pointed out that
if the equidistance method is employed, then the greater the irregularity
and the further from the coastline the area to be delimited, the more unreasonable are the results produced. So great an exaggeration of the consequences of a natural geographical feature must be remedied 2 3or
9
compensated for as far as possible, being of itself creative of inequity.

Commenting on these passages, the Court of Arbitration said
that:
It is also clear that the distinction drawn by the Court between the two
geographical situations is one derived not from any legal theory but from
the very substance of the difference between the two situations. Whereas
in the case of "opposite" States a median line will normally effect a
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. paras. 89-90.
Id. paras. 91-93.
Id. para. 94.
[1969] LC.J. 3, para. 6.
Decision, supra note 7, para. 94.
[1969] LC.J. 3, para. 58.
Id. para. 89(a).
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broadly equitable delimitation, a lateral equidistance line extending out-

ward from the coasts of adjacent States for long distances may not infrequently result in an inequitable delimitation by reason of the distorting

effect of individual geographical features. In short, it is the combined effect of the side-by-side relationship of the two States and the prolongation
of the lateral boundary for great distances to seawards which may be productive of inequity and is the essence of the distinction between "adjacent" and "opposite" coasts situations.240

Reverting to this point in a later passage, the Court of Arbitration was of the view that "the precise system of toponomy
adopted for these various areas is without any legal relevance in
the present proceedings; it is the physical facts of geography, not
nomenclature, with which this Court is concerned."24 1
The court developed this thinking at greater length:
As this Court of Arbitration has already pointed out in paragraphs 81-94,
the appropriateness of the equidistance or any other method for the purpose of effecting an equitable delimitation in any given case is always a
function or reflection of the geographical and other relevant circumstances
of the particular case. In a situation where the coasts of the two States
are opposite each other, the median line will normally effect a broadly
equal and equitable delimitation. But this is simply because of the geometrical effects of applying the equidistance principle to an area of continental shelf which, in fact, lies between coasts that, in fact, face each
other across that continental shelf. In short, the equitable character of the
delimitation results not from the legal designation of the situation as one
of "opposite" States but from its actual geographical characteras such.
Similarly, in the case of "adjacent" States, it is the lateral geographical relation of the two coasts when combined with a large extension of the continental shelf seawards from those coasts, which makes individual
geographical features on either coast more prone to render the geometrical effects of applying the equidistance principle inequitable than in the
case of "opposite" States. The greater risk in these cases that the equidistance method may produce an inequitable delimitation thus also results
not from the legal designation of the situation as one of "adjacent" States
but from its actual geographical characteras one involving laterally related coasts.
What is, moreover, evident is that the relevance of the distinction between
opposite and adjacent coasts is in regard to the operation of the "special
circumstances" element in the "equidistance-special circumstances" rule
laid down in Article 6 for both situations. What is also evident in the view
of the Court, is that the answer to the question whether the effect of individual geographical features is to render an equidistance delimitation "unjustified" or "inequitable" cannot depend on whether the case is legally to
be considered a delimitation between "opposite" or between "adjacent"
States. The appreciation of the effect of individual geographical features
on the course of an equidistance line has necessarily to be made by reference to the actual geographical conditions of the particular area of continental shelf to be delimited and to the actual relation of the two coasts to
240. Decision, supra note 7, para. 95.
241. Id. para. 204.

that particular area. 242

The court was "inclined to the opinion" 243 that the Atlantic region was an opposite-States situation rather than an adjacentStates situation. More important, however, was its view that:
[T]o fix the precise legal classification of the Atlantic region appears to
this Court to be of little importance. The rules of delimitation prescribed
in paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 are the same, and it is the actual geographical relation of the coasts of the two States which determine their
application. What is important is that, in appreciating the appropriateness
of the equidistance method as a means of effecting a "just" or "equitable"
delimitation in the Atlantic region, the Court must have regard both to the
lateral relation of the two coasts as they abut upon the continental shelf of
the great distance seawards that this shelf extends from
the region and
2 4 4to
those coasts.

This eminently sensible and practicable interpretation of Article 6 will be of considerable assistance to States in negotiating
continental shelf boundaries with neighbouring States where nature has been untidy enough to present a configuration that is not
obviously either an opposite-States or an adjacent-States situation.
6. Islands and Archipelagos
The Court of Arbitration had to consider whether the following
features constituted special circumstances or factors creative of
inequity: (1) the Channel Islands, and (2) Ushant and the Scilly
Isles.
a.

The Channel Islands

The court's treatment of the Channel Islands 245 in relation to

the delimitation of the continental shelf is of considerable interest, being the first time that an international tribunal has had to
consider the significance for delimitational purposes of an archipelago situated close to the mainland of one State but under the
sovereignty of a neighbouring State. The Greek and Turkish governments will certainly wish to scrutinise the decision closely for
its possible bearing upon the delimitation of the continental shelf
in the Aegean, where the Turkish coast is fringed by a number of
substantial Greek islands.
As was seen above, the court held that Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention is not applicable in this area and that this part of the
boundary has to be constructed in accordance with international
242. Id. paras. 239-40.
243. Id. para. 242.
244. Id.
245. For a description of the geography of this archipelago, the submarine geology of the area, and the constitutional status of the Channel Islands, see Decision,
supra note 7, paras. 6-9.
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customary law.24 6 The significance of this finding was reduced almost to nil, however, when the court reached the conclusion that
"the different ways in which the requirements of 'equitable principles' or the effects of 'special circumstances' are put reflect
differences of approach and terminology rather than of substance." 247 The court went on to say that:
[T]he substantial point at issue is whether the presence of the British archipelago of the Channel Islands close to the French coast is a "special
circumstance" or a circumstance creative of inequity that calls for a departure from or variation of the equidistance method of delimitation which
the Parties agree to be in principle the applicable method.248

It would seem, therefore, that the court would have reached the
same result by way of the same arguments even had it found Article 6 directly applicable.
The somewhat circuitous route by which the court arrived at
the conclusion that the Channel Islands do constitute special circumstances has been reviewed above in part IV in relation to the
concept of natural prolongation.2 49 The object of this section is to
-examine the court's finding only as it bears upon the question of
what S.W. Boggs called islands "on the wrong side of the median
line."5
France had argued before the court that the opposite coasts to
be taken into account were those of the two mainlands and that
the boundary should consist of (1) a median line between the
mainlands, and (2) a six-mile line around the islands, creating a
Channel Islands enclave. 25 1
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, would have had the
court treat the Channel Islands as the coast of the United Kingdom opposite to France in that part of the Channel. Accordingly,
the median line should describe a deep loop south round the
252
Channel Islands, close to the French coast.

As has been seen, the court decided to draw two boundary
lines, the first being a median line drawn by reference to the two
mainlands and the second, a twelve-mile line to the north and
west of the Channel Island archipelago. This finding seems to be
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See text accompanying notes 23 & 42 supra.
Decision, supra note 7, para. 148.
Id.
Pt. IV(B) supra.
Quoted in Decision, supra note 7, para. 159.
Id. paras. 146-50.
Id. para. 154.

rather extraordinary. As it will doubtless be much cited in the future, the reasoning behind it deserves close scrutiny.
The main steps in the court's argument are as follows:
1. The region forms an integral part of the English Channel
and must be viewed in its context as part of that whole maritime
area.

253

Along the whole 300 miles of the south coast of the Channel runs the
mainland coast of the French Republic; along the whole 300 miles of the
north coast of the Channel runs the mainland coast of the United Kingdom. Each country has some promontories on its coast and the general
result is that the coastlines of their mainlands254
face each other across the
Channel in a relation of approximate equality.

2. Having thus established the macrogeographical perspective
in which to consider the Channel Islands region, the court went
on to observe that:
[WJhere the coastlines of two opposite States are themselves approximately equal in their relation to the continental shelf not only should the
boundary in normal circumstances be the median line but the areas of
shelf left to each Party on either side 255
of the median line should be broadly
equal or at least broadly comparable.

Acknowledging that the presence of the Channel Islands disturbed "the balance of the geographical circumstances," 25 6 the
court felt that the question to be decided was whether, and if so,
in what manner this disturbance should affect the "legal framework"l2 57 within which the boundary had to be delimited.

3. The court found that the legal framework was "that of two
opposite States one of which possesses island territories close to
the coast of the other State. '25 8 It added that the size and importance of the Channel Islands might properly be taken into account in balancing the equities in the region.259
Also part of this legal framework were the twelve-mile fishery
limits of France and of the United Kingdom, the twelve-mile territorial sea of France, and the three-mile and the potential twelvemile territorial sea limits of the United Kingdom.60
Finally, "other elements in the framework" 261 were the various
equitable considerations invoked by the parties regarding their
navigational, defence, and security interests. The court found
that in the circumstances of the case these considerations carried
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. para.181.
Id.
Id. para. 182.
Id. para. 183.
Id.
Id. para. 187.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 188.
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little weight and might simply "support and strengthen, but
[could not] negative, any conclusions that are already indicated
by the geographical, political and legal circumstances of the region which the Court has identified."2 62 In the court's view they
tended to evidence the predominant interests of the French Republic in the southern areas of the English Channel.
4. Following its consideration of the natural prolongation doctrine, the court went on to hold that: "Any ground of equity... is
*.

.

to be looked for in the particular circumstances of the present

case and in the particular equality of the two States in their geographical relation to the continental shelf of the Channel." 263
The court found that to give full effect to the Islands would result in a substantial diminution of the area of the shelf that would
otherwise accrue to France; that this fact was prima facie creative
of inequity; and that the presence of the islands would, prima facie, constitute a "special circumstance" if Article 6 were applicable. Prima facie, therefore, a departure from the median line
seemed to be justified. It was necessary to show, however, that a
departure from the median line would be "equitable" or "justified" also in relation to the United Kingdom and in the light of all
the relevant circumstances. 264
The court accepted that a certain weight should be attached to
the equitable considerations invoked by the United Kingdom-the political and economic character of the Islands, their
close ties with the United Kingdom and the latter's responsibility
for their defence and security, and the fact that they had the possibility of enjoying an appreciable area of continental shelf only to
265
their west and north.
5. Weighing the various equities in the balance, the court decided that the primary element was that the Channel Islands region forms part of the English Channel, throughout the whole
length of which the parties face each other as opposite States
having almost equal coastlines. 266 In the court's view the equitable considerations invoked by the United Kingdom invalidated
the French proposal for a six-mile enclave for the Channel Islands
but did not justify the adoption of the United Kingdom's propos262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

para.
para.
para.
para.

195.
197.
198.
199.

als. 267 As has been seen, the court drew two lines, a median line
between the two mainlands and a second twelve-mile line to the
north and west of the Islands.
Whether viewed as the application of international customary
law or as indicative of what the court's findings would have been
had Article 6 been directly applicable, the court's ruling in this region seems hard to justify. No one, probably, would quarrel with
the court's finding that the presence of the Islands constitutes
special circumstances or a factor creative of inequity. However, it
is difficult to regard the remedy prescribed by the court as other
than the substitution of one inequity for another. Having rejected
the line claimed by the United Kingdom (a deep loop south round
the Islands), it was open to the court to balance the equities and
to give effect to the equitable considerations invoked by the
United Kingdom in any one of at least three ways. First, it could
have denied the United Kingdom any continental shelf around
the Islands but compensated it with a southward bulge in the
mid-Channel median line. Second, it could have sanctioned both
a continental shelf enclave around the Islands and a more limited
southward bulge in the median line. The court preferred the third
option-the retention of an unmodified mid-Channel median line
and the establishment of an enclave around the Islands. Although the "potentiality of an extension" of the United Kingdom
territorial sea to twelve miles was one of the elements taken into
account by the Court in determining the dimensions of this enclave, 268 it nevertheless purported to achieve an equitable result
by limiting the breadth of the enclave to twelve miles. Considering that the United Kingdom could have secured territorial sea
rights in the whole of this enclave simply by extending its territorial sea to the twelve-mile breadth enjoyed by France since 1971,
such an outcome can scarcely be described as equitable. Indeed,
such a delimitation seems almost to deny that islands are entitled
to a continental shelf, though of course such a denial would be
difficult to square with Article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf and its endorsement by the I.C.J. as declaratory
of international customary law.2 69 The delimitation is all the more
difficult to accept as a properly balanced judgment of the equities
when one recalls that the Islands comprise a land area of 195
square kilometres and support a population of 130,000. The
court's evaluation of the equities certainly seems less persuasive
here than in relation to the Scilly Isles.
267. Id. para. 198.
268. Id. para. 187.
269. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, f1969] LC.J. 3, para. 63.
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b. The Scilly Isles
The court's treatment of the Scilly Isles offers an instructive example of an archipelago 2 7O on the "right" side of the median line
constituting special circumstances. As the court pointed out, the
greater projection of the United Kingdom coast into the Atlantic
region, though partly due to the fact that the United Kingdom
mainland extends one degree further west than the French mainland, is also due to the greater extension westwards of the Scilly
Isles beyond the United Kingdom mainland than that of Ushant
beyond the French mainland.
Thus, at its nearest point, Ushant is only about 10 miles and at its most
westerly point no more than 14.1 nautical miles from the coast of
Finistbre; the nearest point of the Scilly Isles, on the other hand, is some
21 nautical miles and their most westerly point some 31 miles distant from
Land's End. As a result, even when account is taken of the slight southwesterly trend of the English Channel, the further extension south-westwards of the United Kingdom's coast has a tendency to make it obtrude
upon the continental shelf situated to seawards2 7of
the more westerly fac1
ing coast of the French Republic in that region.

As the court indicated in a later passage:
The effect of the presence of the Scilly Isles west-south-west of Cornwall
is to deflect the equidistance line on a considerably more south-westerly
course than would be the case if it were to be delimited from the baselines
of the English mainland. The difference in the angle is 16O36'14"; the extent of the additional area of shelf accruing to the United Kingdom, and
correspondingly not accruing to the French Republic, in the Atlantic region eastwards of the one thousand metre isobath is approximately four
thousand square miles. 2 7 2

The court did, of course, acknowledge that this fact of nature
did not in itself justify a departure from an equidistance line
drawn by reference to the Scillies. The question was rather to decide whether "in the light of all the pertinent geographical circumstances, that fact amounts to an inequitable distortion of the
equidistance line producing disproportionate effects on the areas
of shelf accruing to the two States."

273

The court decided that it did. In its view,
the further projection westwards of the Scilly Isles, when superadded to
the greater projection of the Cornish mainland westwards beyond
Finlstbre, is of much the same nature for present purposes, and has much
the same tendency to distortion of the equidistance line, as the projection
270. The Scillies Group consists of 48 islands, six of which are inhabited, with a
total population (in 1971) of 2,428. Decision, supra note 7, para. 4.
271. Id. para. 235.
272. Id. para. 243.
273. Id.

of an exceptionally long promontory, which is generally
recognized to be
' 274
one of the potential forms of "special circumstances.

As noted above, the court held that to give "half-effect" to the
Scillies would bring about an appropriate abatement of the disproportionate effects of this "considerable projection onto the Atlantic continental shelf of a somewhat attenuated portion of the
coast of the United Kingdom."

275

274. Id. para. 244.
275. Id. para. 249. It is, however, seriously open to doubt whether an "appropriate abatement" was effected by the boundary line specified in the court's
dispositif and drawn on the Boundary-Line Chart. In applying to the court for an
interpretation of the Decision of June 30, 1977, the United Kingdom argued that
there was an inconsistency between the method of delimitation prescribed by the
court in the body of its decision (the "half-effect" formula) and the course of the
line M-N specified in the dispositif and drawn on the Boundary-Line Chart. The
basis of the United Kingdom's complaint is reflected in the following passages in
Professor Briggs' dissenting opinion appended to the court's Decision of 14 March
1978, supra note 7, at 124:
The Court's Expert was instructed to calculate the boundary-line on the
basis of the above-mentioned determination of the Court [Decision (of
June 30, 1977), supra note 7, paras. 248-54]; however, the Court did not appreciate that the boundary-line he depicted on a Mercator chart was a loxodrome which, over its course of about 170 nautical miles, disregarded the
sphericity of the earth, instead of a geodesic conforming to the earth's curvature-a divergence not readily detectable to international lawyers from
examination of the chart on which he drew the line.
The majority of the court held that:
JI]t has not been established that the course of the line M-N defined in
the dispositifand traced on the Boundary-Line Chart is in such contradiction with the findings of the Court in paragraphs 251, 253 and 254 of the
Decision of 30 June 1977 as to be incompatible with the method of delimitation prescribed in these findings.
Decision of 14 March 1978, supra note 7, para. 114, at 113.
This finding is as notable for what it does not say as for what it does, and a more
candid account of the embarrassing position in which the court found itself is provided by the following passages in Professor Waldock's separate opinion, id. at
117:
I agree with the Court's conclusion that the information available does
not appear to establish that the delimination of a maritime boundary by a
loxodrome line on a standard navigational chart based on Mercator projection without correction for scale error is either inadmissible in law or so
outmoded in practice as to make its use open, in general, to challenge. It
is necessary, on the other hand, to consider the possible impact in this
connection of the great extension seawards of the boundary in the present
case, combined with the lateral relation of the coasts of the United Kingdom and France in the Atlantic region. The Court, as it has recognised,
made this combination of circumstances one of the cardinal elements in
its decision to allow only half-effect to the Scilly Isles ....
Unfortunately, Professor Waldock felt, on balance, that a reconsideration along
these lines was not open to the court under Article 10 of the Arbitration Agreement. He nevertheless expressed what to the present writer is the unassailable
view that: "[I]f the matter were now to be open to reconsideration, I am of the
opinion that the Court ought certainly to take account of the effect of the curvature of the earth on the operation of the equidistance principle over great distances such as those in the Atlantic region." Id. at 121.
It seems fair to conclude that, had the Court been aware of the implications of
using the loxodrome method adopted by its Expert, it would in fact have used the
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D.

Conclusions

Drawing together the various sections of part VI, what contribution has the decision of the Court of Arbitration made to the elucidation of the concept of special circumstances and of the
relationship between Article 6 of the Geneva Convention and the
corresponding rules of international customary law?
1. Relationship Between Article 6 and Rules of
International Customary Law
It was concluded, on the basis of the analysis of "special circumstances" presented in section B, that this concept was much
more limited in scope and less open to arbitrary and subjective
concretisation than the principle of equity as interpreted by the
I.C.J. in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, reviewed in section A. The Court of Arbitration would not appear to share this
view and has gone a considerable way toward identifying "special
circumstances" in the meaning of Article 6 with the equitable factors identified by the I.C.J. in the North Sea Cases. The conclusion was reached in section C(1) that, in Professor Briggs' words,
the Court of Arbitration's interpretation of Article 6 "constitutes
some threat that the rule of positive law expressed in Article 6
will be eroded by its identification with subjective equitable principles, permitting attempts by the Court to redress the inequities
2 76
of geography."
2.

Status of Equidistance Rule and Burden of Proof of
Special Circumstances

In section C(2), the opinion was expressed that a review of the
travaux pr~paratoires of Article 6 indicates that the parties to the
Geneva Convention intended the equidistance rule to be regarded
as the general or residual rule and that the onus of proof lies
upon those pleading special circumstances to prove their existence. It was concluded that the contrary view adopted by the
court-that, strictly speaking, there is no burden of proof-is not
only contrary to the intention of the parties but is open to the
same objection as the court's view of the relationship between Article 6 and international customary law.
geodesic method. If this is so, it follows that the United Kingdom has been unjustly deprived of a significant area of continental shelf.
276. Decision, supra note 7, at 236 (declaration of Mr. H.W. Briggs).

3.

No Legal Limit to Considerations Which May Be Taken
into Account to Ensure the Application of
Equitable Principles

The court's restrictive interpretation of this somewhat ambiguous dictum from the I.C.J.'s judgment will, it may be hoped, discourage States from reading it too literally and from invoking as
equitable considerations matters that, in law, clearly cannot properly be so considered.
4. Proportionality Factor
Section C(4) concluded that the Court of Arbitration's reinterpretation of the significance of the so-called proportionality factor
has placed it in its proper perspective. The court's reinterpretation established that the factor is simply a criterion that may be
called in aid to determine whether a particular geographical feature does constitute special circumstances because of its unjust
distorting effects.
5.

Opposite-State and Adjacent-State Situations

There are many situations in the world where the coasts of
neighbouring States are not clearly classifiable as either opposite
or adjacent. The court's sensible and practicable interpretation of
Article 6 will facilitate its application in such cases.
6.

Islands and Archipelagos as Special Circumstances

On the basis of an examination of the court's treatment of the
archipelagos of the Channel Islands and of the Scilly Isles, it
seems reasonable to conclude that less than justice was done to
the United Kingdom. In relation to the Channel Islands, the
court's decision seems difficult to justify either in terms of the application of the special circumstances rule to a substantial group
of islands or in terms of a comparison with its treatment of the
Scilly Isles. As regards the Scillies, the half-effect formula appears to be justifiable in principle but its application by the court
is open to serious criticism.
VII

MACROGEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES AND THE COURT'S
COMPETENCE

In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the I.C.J. had to delimit the continental shelf areas appertaining to three neighbouring States-a situation that, in the view of the I.C.J., was "never
really envisaged or taken into account" in the drafting of Article 6
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of the Geneva Convention. 27 7 In dealing with this situation, the
I.C.J. took the view that "given a geographical situation of quasiequality"--in the length of the coastal frontages of the three
States-it was necessary to abate the effects of an incidental special feature (the concavity of the German coast) from which an
unjustifiable difference of treatment could result.2 7

8

In other

words, strict application of the equidistance principle would be
unjustifiable because it would not bring about the results to be
expected from application of the quasi-equality doctrine: that is,
reasonable proportionality between length of coastal frontage and
area of continental shelf.
As noted above,27 9 adoption of this quasi-equality/ proportionality test involved acceptance of the so-called "macrogeographical
perspective." Thus, calculation of reasonable proportionality of
the continental shelves of States A and B by reference to coastal
frontage may require a consideration of the shelf of State C, for it
is only by reference to State B's boundary with State C that the
area of State B's continental shelf may be calculated. As suggested above, 280 there seems to be no justification for asserting
the relevance of the boundary between States B and C to delimitation of the boundary between A and B. In a case between A
and B, is State C to be bound by the frontier between it and B
that the court used as a basis for application of the proportionality rule? One might ask, too, what the I.C.J.'s attitude would have
been if only the Danish-German boundary dispute had been referred to it and not also the German-Netherlands boundary.
Would the court still have adopted a three-State macrogeographical perspective? That it would have done is suggested by the fact
that, in ensuring a reasonable degree of proportionality between
length of coasts and areas of continental shelf, the court held that
account was to be taken "of the effects, actual or prospective, of
any other continental shelf delimitations between adjacent States
in the same region." 28 1
A similar question was raised in the Anglo-French Case by the
United Kingdom contention that, in assessing what would be an
equitable delimitation between itself and France, account should
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

[1969) LC.J. 3, para. 54.
Id. paras. 89-91.
See text accompanying note 216 supra.
Id.
[19691 LCJ. 3, para. 101 (emphasis added).

be taken of "the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf delimitations between adjacent States in the same region." 282 The court was invited to consider the analogy between
the situation of the United Kingdom, as the middle State compressed between the French and Irish areas of continental shelf,
and that of Germany, caught between Denmark and the Netherlands.
The court was able to dispose of this argument simply by emphasising
that the task entrusted to it in the Atlantic region by the Arbitration
Agreement is the precise one of deciding the course of the boundary between the portions of the continental shelf appertaining to the United
to the French Republic respectively as far as the 1,000-metre
Kingdom28 and
3
isobath.

It went on, however, to say that:
Furthermore, as will subsequently appear in paragraph 250 of the Decision, the Court does not consider that the course of the boundary between
the United Kingdom and the French Republic in that region depends on
any nice calculations of proportionality based on conjectures as to the
course of a prospective boundary between the United Kingdom and the
Republic of Ireland. Nor would it be open to the Court, on the basis of any
such conjectures, to pronounce in these proceedings on the position of the
tripoint, if any, at which the Irish Republic's boundary with the United
should be held to meet the latter's boundary with the French
Kingdom 284
Republic.

The court left no shadow of doubt about the relationship between its decision and the boundary still to be determined between the United Kingdom and Ireland. The court thought it
appropriate
formally to state that both its reasoning and its conclusions in this Decision are directed exclusively to the delimitation of the continental shelf
boundary between the Parties to the present proceedings. It follows that
no inferences may be drawn from this Decision as to views of the Court
concerning the prospective course of the continental shelf boundary still
to be delimited between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland
nor concerning the legal and factual considerations relevant to the delimitation of that boundary. The Court's Decision, it scarcely needs to be said,
will be binding only as between the Parties to the present arbitration and
will neither be binding upon nor create any rights or obligations for any
third State, and in particular for the Republic of Ireland for which the Decision will be res inter alios acta. In so far as there may be a possibility
that the two successive delimitations of continental shelf zones in this region, where the three States are neighbours abutting on the same continental shelf, may result in some overlapping of the zones, it is manifestly
outside the competence of this Court to decide in advance and hypothetically the legal problem which may then arise. That problem would
normally find its appropriate solution by negotiations directly between the
three States concerned, negotiations which may indeed be called for by
the prolongation of their maritime zones beyond the 1,000-metre isobath to
282. Decision,supra note 7, para. 24.
283. Id. para. 27.
284. Id.
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28
200 nautical miles.

5

Whether there will be any such problem should become appar-

ent relatively soon. The United Kingdom informed the court that,
on February 18, 1977, it had addressed a Note to the government
of the Irish Republic accepting the latter's proposal of April 2,
1976, to refer the delimitation of the continental shelf as between
their two countries to an independent settlement-of-disputes procedure through some form of third-party settlement of a judicial
286
nature.

VIII. THE STATUS OF THE UNCLOS III NEGOTIATING TEXTS
The status of draft Articles produced by UNCLOS III has been
considered twice by international judicial bodies within the past
five years. In 1974, in the FisheriesJurisdictionCase between the
United Kingdom and Iceland, the I.C.J. referred to its awareness
"of present endeavours ... to achieve in a third Conference on
the Law of the Sea the further codification and progressive development of this branch of the law" and of "various proposals and
preparatory documents produced in this framework, which must
be regarded as manifestations of the views and opinions of individual States and as vehicles of their aspirations, rather than as
expressing principles of existing law." 287 It held that "in the circumstances, the Court, as a court of law, cannot render judgment
sub specie legisferendae, or anticipate the law before the legisla288
tor has laid it down."
As has been seen, the same question arose three years later in
the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case, France having argued
that the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf had been
rendered obsolete by a series of developments, including the
UNCLOS II proceedings. 2 89 The Court of Arbitration, in rejecting
this contention, said that "only the most conclusive indications of
the intention of the parties to the 1958 Convention to regard it as
terminated could warrant this Court in treating it as obsolete and
inapplicable as between" the parties. 290 The court did examine
285. Id. para. 28.
286. Id. para. 26.
287. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1974 I.C.J. 3, para. 53.

288. Id.
289. Decision, supra note 7,

290. Id. para. 47.

at 20.

Article 71 of the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT),291 the
earlier version of Article 83 of the Informal Composite Negotiating
Text (ICNT),292 but was careful to mention that it had not yet
been adopted by the Conference and was still a matter of discus293

sion.

At the present time (February, 1979), Article 83 of the ICNT is
still a matter of discussion and has no legal force as a treaty provision. It cannot be said as yet to have reached that point of maturity at which it might be possible to say, by virtue of its clearly
demonstrated general acceptability as a rule of customary law,
that it "evidence[s] the assent of the States concerned to the
modification, or even termination, of previously existing treaty
rights and obligations." 294 The present unstable state of the Article is indicated by a passage in the Report of the chairman of Negotiating Group 7 of Committee II on the work of the Group
during the first part of UNCLOS M's Seventh Session (Geneva,
28 March to 19 May 1978 ).295 Commenting on Article 83 (1), the
chairman reported that:
Like before, the positions of the delegations differed markedly between
those in support of the equidistance solution and those favouring delimitation in accordance with equitable principles. The main proposals on this
basic issue are contained in working documents NG7/2, sponsored by 22
States advocating the employment of the median or equidistance line as a
general principle, and NG7/10, sponsored by 29 States emphasizing equitable principles as the basic premise for any measures of delimitation. No
compromise on this point did materialize during the discussions held, although one may note, that there appears to be general agreement as regards two of the various elements of delimitation: first, consensus seems
to prevail to the effect that any measure of delimitation should be effected
by agreement, and second, all the proposals presented refer to relevant or
special circumstances as factors to be taken into account in the process of
delimitation. As a whole, however, no approach or formulation received
such widespread and substantial support that would offer a substantially
improved prospect of a consensus in the Plenary. On the other hand, the
could not, either, be reached
discussions clearly indicated that consensus
296
upon the present formulation in the ICNT.

He concluded that: "Tere was a general feeling within the
Group that negotiations on the delimitation problems concerned
should be continued at a later stage of the Conference and that
291. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1, reprinted in 5 UNCLOS III OR 125
(1976).
292. U.N. Docs. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10 & Add. 1, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS III OR 1,
and in 16 hVr'L LEGAL MATERALuS 1099 (1977).

293. Decision, supra note 7, para. 96.
294. Id. para. 47.
295. UNCLOS MI,Reports of the Committees and Negotiating Groups on negotiations at the Seventh Session contained in a single document both for the purposes of record and for the convenience of delegations, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
62/RCNG/1, reprintedin 10 UNCLOS MIOR 13 (1978).
296. Id. at 124.
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the rules of delimitation and the settlement of disputes thereon
should not be separated from each other."297 Nor was any significant progress made during the second part of the Seventh Session (New York, August 21 to September 15, 1978).298
As was noted above, despite the embryonic nature of Article 71
of the RSNT, the Court of Arbitration did examine this provision,
which is virtually identical to Article 83 of the ICNT. It is of some
interest to note that the court found
no reason to suppose that, if they [the provisions of RSNT] were applicable, they would make any difference to the determination of the course of
the boundary in the present case. Those texts speak of delimitation between "adjacent" or "opposite" States in accordance with equitable principles as distinct cases; and they envisage that, where appropriate, the
equidistance or median line shall be employed, taking account of all the
relevant circumstances. Since it is the geographical circumstances which
primarily determine the appropriateness of the equidistance or any other
method of delimitation in any given case, the Revised Single Negotiating
Text would not appear to visualise the solution of cases like the present
one on principles materially different from those applicable under the 1958
Convention or under general international law.2 99

As was seen in part V, the writer's interpretation of "special circumstances" in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention is somewhat
narrower than that of the Court of Arbitration. It may be questioned, therefore, whether it is appropriate to regard the formula
in Article 83 of the ICNT as being to the same effect as that in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention. As the following parallel texts
show, the language of Article 83 follows very closely the language
of the judgment of the I.C.J. in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, though it drops the court's reference to "natural prolongation":

297. Id. at 125.
298. See Report by the Chairman of Negotiating Group 7 on the work of the
Group at its 17th-27th meetings, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C.2/NG7/24, reprintedin 10
UNCLOS m OR 170 (1978).
299. Decision, supra note 7, para. 96.

LCJ. Judgment in North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases Para.
101(C) (1):
delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable
principles, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in such a way
as to leave as much as possible to each Party all those
parts of the continental
shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land
territory into and under the
sea, without encroachment
on the natural prolongation
of the land territory of the
other.

ICNT
Article 83 (1)
The delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent or opposite States shall
be effected by agreement in
accordance with equitable
principles, employing, where
appropriate, the median or
equidistance line, and taking
account of all the relevant
circumstances.

As suggested above,3 00 the formula adopted by the I.C.J. is
much more open to subjective, arbitrary concretisation than are
the terms of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention. The application
of Article 83 of the ICNT might allow account to be taken of a
number of factors that would not properly fall to be considered as
potential special circumstances under Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention.
IX.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECISION

If only because it is the second continental shelf boundary dispute to be settled by judicial means and the first between parties
to the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, the AngloFrench Case will certainly be studied very closely by those whose
task it is to negotiate the settlement of other outstanding boundary disputes. Reference has already been made to the Anglo-Irish
boundary and to the Rockall dispute. In view of certain similarities between the issues raised by the Anglo-French Case on the
one hand and those presented by the Greco-Turkish dispute in
the Aegean and by the United States-Canadian dispute in the
Gulf of Maine on the other hand, the decision will clearly influence the negotiating stance and legal arguments of those countries.
How influential the decision will prove to be will depend in part
on the outcome of UNCLOS III. If, contrary to present indications, a clear, workable formula is devised for the delimitation of
the continental shelf between neighbouring States, the decision
may prove to be of only transitional importance. Even in that
300. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
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event, however, it is likely to be some considerable time before
the new convention comes into force. It was not, after all, until
1964 that the much more simple 1958 Convention entered into
force. Even now only fifty-three States are bound by it.
Reviewing the analysis presented in parts H-VIII above, it
seems likely that the principal contributions the decision will
make to the law of the continental shelf will be:
1. In general, the decision has toned down and put a welcome
moderating gloss on many of the dicta of the I.C.J. in the North
Sea Cases.
2. The decision has helped to clarify the relationship between
301
In
the Geneva Convention and international customary law.
doing so, the court has taken a position that enabled it to emphasize on the one hand that pacta sunt servanda is still a basic principle of treaty law, while acknowledging on the other hand that
consensual obligations may under certain conditions be modified
or terminated by developments in customary law. The status in
this context of developments in UNCLOS M has been carefully
stated, following the line taken by the I.C.J. in the North Sea
Cases. 3 0 2

3. The decision will help to dispose of the fallacious notion,
fostered by the I.C.J.'s judgment in the North Sea Cases, that the
concept of natural prolongation is of major relevance to the delimitation of the continental shelf between neighbouring States. 303
4. The value of the court's contribution to the elucidation of
the concept of special circumstances and of the relationship between Article 6 of the Geneva Convention and the corresponding
rules of international customary law is less clear.30 4 The court
has certainly performed a useful service in restrictively reinterpreting the I.C.J.'s dicta on the "proportionality factor" and on
there being no legal limit to the considerations that may be taken
into account to ensure the application of equitable principles.
Again, the court's common-sense approach to geographical configurations that are neither opposite-coast nor adjacent-coast
situtations will surely obviate much legalistic argument in relation to other such situations. However, it is regrettable that the
301. See pt. M1supra.
302. See also pt. VI supra.
303. See pt. V supra.

304. See the list of conclusions at pt. VI(D) supra.

court saw fit to go as far as it did toward identifying "special circumstances" in the meaning of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention with the equitable factors identified by the I.C.J. in the North
Sea Cases. Nor would it appear that the court's view of the status
of the equidistance rule and of the burden of proof of special circumstances is well-founded.
5. Finally, the court's firm refusal to adopt a macrogeographical perspective and to have regard to a prospective Anglo-Irish
boundary in determining the Anglo-French boundary should help
to ensure that this undesirable doctrine is buried once and for
al.305

305. See pt. VII supra.

